



Land justice, land reform and access

Proposals for land justice for poor families with particular emphasis on Zambia

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Introduction

In recent years, Zambia has registered positive economic gains with annual economic growth rate averaging 6.1%, helping it graduate from a Lower Income Country to a Lower-Middle Income Country, with an annual per capita income of US\$ 1,070. However, this positive trend in macroeconomic indicators has not translated into improved living standards for many ordinary citizens, especially in rural areas, where poverty levels are still very high, over 80% compared to about 55% in urban areas (IFAD, 2011).

The high dependency of more than 90% of rural households on agriculture-based livelihoods, has led to the prioritisation of agriculture on the national development agenda in order to increase rural incomes, food security and ultimately reduce poverty. The challenge is how to achieve these development goals in a global liberalised economy where there are competing demands for food, energy and raw materials, without undermining livelihoods of poor families.

The European Union (EU) has adopted an expanded trade policy that requires open markets in both the EU and developing countries to facilitate trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and access to raw materials to support increasing domestic consumption requirements in Europe. This, in addition to energy policies (such as the increasing use and production of biofuels) and the global food crises of 2008 has created unprecedented demand for land and raw materials in developing countries. The liberalised market economic policies (including the liberalisation of land markets) embraced by the Zambian government at the behest of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and as part of trade negotiations with the EU (in the form of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)), have increased land injustices and obstacles that poor families face in accessing legal title to land, consequently undermining their agriculture-based livelihoods.

This paper will look at some of the main issues surrounding land injustice in Zambia, beginning with an examination of obstacles poor families face in securing land rights and tenure security, and then discussing alternative policy proposals. It will also show how the current EU trade and investment policy, especially as mediated through EPA negotiations, will undermine the realisation of these alternative proposals, and concludes by providing policy recommendations to the EU, government, civil society, local communities and general public, on how best to secure land justice for the poor and protect their right to food security and a decent livelihood.

A. OBSTACLES POOR FAMILIES FACE IN SECURING LEGAL TITLE TO LAND IN ZAMBIA

Zambia has a dual land tenure system comprising leasehold administered by the Ministry of Lands (6% of total land mass), and customary tenure (94% of total land mass) administered by traditional leaders or chiefs. Most of the rural population live in areas which are under customary tenure characterised by informal arrangements of land access and ownership. Most of the urban areas, particularly along the line of rail, fall under leasehold tenure characterised by formal land 'ownership' or legal title with different lease periods ranging from 12 years for land records issued by local authorities to 99 years for title deeds issued by the Ministry of Lands. The pluralism or dualism in land tenure was inherited from colonial times and continued under the current market-led land reforms that began in the 1990s.

All things being equal, holding land on legal title offers many benefits, including legal protection from arbitrary land displacements (i.e. land-grabbing), provides solid proof of land ownership and reduces land ownership disputes, facilitates land transactions, facilitates inheritance or bequeath of land, can act as an incentive for increased investment on a piece of land to increase productivity, and can be used as collateral to access credit. Under the current market-led land reforms however, many ordinary citizens particularly poor families face various obstacles in obtaining legal title to land. Most of these obstacles exist in customary areas where the majority of poor families live. These obstacles are discussed below.

a) Liberalisation, land markets, demand and competition for land: In the 1990s, Zambia began to implement a series of reforms to liberalise markets, promote Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and protect investor interests. These reforms were being pushed on one hand by the IMF and World Bank as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), meant to transform Zambia into a market economy. The other push came from trade liberalisation, both at WTO level and at bilateral level (as in EPAs), which required opening up markets to promote FDI and increase access to natural resources in developing countries. The concept of liberalisation and land markets, however, has stifled access to land by many poor families in Zambia in both customary and leasehold tenure (see Box 1). In the past, acquiring land in customary areas was affordable for many poor people as it only involved payment in-kind, i.e. presentation of a homage gift of any kind depending on one's capability, to the local Chief or traditional leader. However, with the introduction of land markets access to land by poor


families has become costly, since traditional authorities are demanding large sums of money or huge gifts equivalent or matched to the market value of land. This is disadvantaging poor families and paving way for foreign entities, rich investors, and elites from urban areas to acquire huge tracts of land in customary areas because they have the ability to meet these demands.

Even access to leasehold land directly from the Ministry of Lands, which used to be relatively easy, has become more costly and beyond the reach of many poor families. In addition to consideration fees, there are several other charges to accessing and holding leasehold land such as survey fees, consent fees, annual ground rent and property rates etc. The Government has in recent years revised these rates or charges upwards in response to the increasing market-value of land.

BOX 1: LIBERALISATION AND FDI AS OBSTACLES TO LAND ACCESS BY POOR FAMILIES

The effects of liberalised land markets and FDI on access to land by poor families is more apparent in government led land development programmes such as the Farm Block Development Programme and the Multi Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ). These are new government programmes that are aimed at opening up virgin land including underutilised land under customary areas and providing basic services such as water, roads and electricity to attract investments in agriculture, processing and manufacturing industries. Obtaining land in these serviced areas is not only expensive but impossible for poor local populations who live on less than US\$1 a day, since the focus is on attracting FDI and to a lesser extent local investment. In relative terms, the cost of this land is nothing to rich foreign entities, which means that this land is given away for very little in the name of attracting FDIs.

An example includes the recent land allocation (in 2011) in the Nansanga Farm Block involving more than 150,000 hectares in the Central part of Zambia, where more than 250 pieces of land (ranging from approx. 10–100 ha each) were allocated to elites from urban areas with the core ventures (core ventures are more than 7000 ha each) offered to large local and foreign corporations. Less than 50 pieces of land (ranging about 10–20 ha) were reserved for local people. However, it is not even clear what criteria will be used, if and when this land is allocated to local people. This is a form of land injustice facilitated by the government, since most of this land is acquired from customary areas with little or no consultation, and no benefits and/or compensation to the affected communities. The investor protection and leasehold period of 99 years granted to investors is too long to reverse any land injustices that poor host communities face.



Source: Ministry of Lands (2010)

The increased competition and demand for land and natural resources due to liberalisation of land markets does not only constrain access to land but is also an important causal factor for land dispossession or displacements of poor families in the country. Figure 1 shows increasing demand for agriculture land in Zambia over the last 5 years.

This increasing demand for land leads to displacements of poor families to pave way for rich investors. Currently there are several cases of displacements of the rural poor across the country due to increasing FDIs. Box 2 below describes the Macha displacement case arising from increased demand for land for FDI.

BOX 2: MACHA DISPLACEMENT CASE

Macha is a missionary site in Choma District in the Southern Province, about 450km south of Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia. The Macha displacement case involved the eviction of over 3,000 people from a piece of land measuring about 3,003 acres, which the Missionary church had obtained from the local people in 1906. The church has been utilising less than 10% of the land. Over the years local people began to settle on the remaining part of the land, some with permission from the church as part of the retirement benefits after working for it and others for convenience purposes – proximity to health and education facilities provided by the church. The Christian mission and the local community lived in harmony under this arrangement for a long time until the community was forcefully displaced in 2010.

This was after the missionary church sub-leased part of the land to a foreign investor to grow jatropha (a biofuel crop) and to undertake other developments. The displacement was done through a court order granted to the missionary church without legal representation of the poor local community.

However, with social mobilisation and support from Zambia Land Alliance, the Macha community was able to challenge the displacement and was granted a 'Stay of Execution' to allow it to continue having access and utilising the disputed land for their farming and other livelihood activities until the case was fully determined by the High Court. At the moment the case is still in the court.

b) Land Policy and Legal Framework: At the moment, Zambia has no clear land policy. Policy decisions are executed through the existing Lands Act of 1995, Statutory Instruments by the Minister of Lands and ad hoc pronouncements by the President. Efforts to have a national land policy since the 1990s have not been successful due to many contentious issues associated with liberalised market policies, which is the main thrust of the reforms. The process of formulating the land policy has also been taken over by events such as the National Constitutional reforms that have taken long to complete. The lack of a clear land policy makes land administration chaotic. The current land administration is characterised by lengthy procedures of land acquisition, bureaucracy and corruption in land allocation, political interference, and poor coordination of institutions responsible for various functions in land administration. This confusion makes it very difficult for poor families to access land, let alone to seek legal justice in cases of land rights violations.

The current land law (Lands Act of 1995) was enacted hurriedly under controversial circumstances without adequate consultations of stakeholders, particularly chiefs, smallholder farmers, civil society and ordinary citizens. The Lands Act of 1995 is based on liberalised market principles, which have led to stiff competition in accessing land. This Land Law offers very little to poor families, and benefits mainly rich and foreign entities. The law is very weak in many respects including its lack of provision for sufficient minimum guidelines on the administration of customary land. This, in addition to the unwritten nature of customary law or practices used to administer customary tenure, leaves room for manipulation and corruption.

c) Corruption in land administration: The bureaucracy of obtaining land on legal title introduces corrupt practices on the part of public officers who demand monetary inducements to facilitate speedy processes of acquiring legal title to land. Corruption is rampant in government institutions that play key roles in land administration. Currently, the Ministry of Lands and Local Authorities in Zambia rank highly in terms of corruption. Corruption has a tendency of pushing up the cost of acquiring land on legal title and excluding poor families.

d) Low Awareness of Land Laws and Procedures of acquiring legal title: The low levels of awareness of the provisions in land laws and procedures in land acquisition by many poor families form an important obstacle to obtaining legal title to land. This low awareness is largely a result of the exclusion of ordinary citizens and poor people in formulating land policies, laws and procedures and low literacy levels. Inadequate outreach and sensitisation of poor families in rural areas by both

government and civil society also largely contribute to low awareness levels.

e) Resistance by traditional leaders to grant consent for legal title: The Lands Act of 1995 grants legal power to traditional leaders (chiefs) to give consent to individuals willing to convert land from customary to leasehold tenure. However, most chiefs are not willing to provide this consent under the current legal framework. This is because granting of consent for land conversion entails chiefs losing authority and control over land in their chiefdoms. In addition, despite chiefs playing this critical role in land administration, the current arrangement does not provide incentives for performing this function. Most of the benefits accrue to the central government in the form of various land fees and property taxes, which are not shared with traditional leaders.

B. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS

In order to ensure that poor families enjoy their land rights in the face of EU trade policy, there are several alternatives that can be explored. Alternative proposals focus on addressing the obstacles that poor families face in accessing and obtaining legal title to land. A lot of work has already been done by civil society groups such the Zambia Land Alliance in documenting some of the alternative proposals for securing legal titles to land for poor families in the Zambian context. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and other international organisations have also in recent years developed and championed voluntary guidelines for responsible investments in agriculture and natural resources. This includes the Responsible Agriculture Investments (RAI) Initiative by the World Bank and other international organisations. The application of a combination of these alternative proposals would go a long way towards addressing the many injustices caused by the imposition of neo-liberal policies in agriculture and land by EU trade and investment policy, and IMF and World Bank conditionalities. The following paragraphs discuss some of these workable alternatives:

Proposals for addressing land grabs and protecting poor families

Strengthening national land policy, legal framework and investment guidelines would significantly help reduce land grabs and protect the interests of poor families. This should firstly involve developing a comprehensive pro-poor land policy to guide the review of legislation for land administration in the country. The pro-poor policies and review of legislation need to address factors that facilitate land grabbing such as weak policy and the legal and institutional frameworks for land administration. The current land laws do not adequately protect land rights

of poor families, particularly under customary tenure due to lack of clear legal guidelines for customary land administration.

Adopting more consultative processes in the formulation of land policies and legislation is critical not only in increasing awareness of land rights by poor families, but also in addressing the real issues affecting them. Adoption and legal recognition of democratic consultative processes involving different groups of community members in the acquisition and conversion of customary land could help minimise land grabs, unlike the current arrangement which only recognises the chief or traditional leader. Providing deliberate legal requirements in the investment guidelines for all investments to reserve a specified minimum shareholding and benefits to host communities could secure land rights of poor families. In such an arrangement shareholding by local communities should be based on the land contribution to the investment. Alternatively, the community could sub-lease part of its land to investors. In this way the communities would benefit from FDIs.

However, for these proposals to work, local communities need to firstly register legal entities or trusts to legally own land. This could either involve identification of strategic land in the communities for allocation or sub-leasing to investors based on participatory land-use planning processes or it could be by way of delineating and registering the whole chiefdom and obtaining a block title where individual titles including title to investors are granted on a sub-lease basis.

However, these alternative proposals require capacity building of traditional authorities in various issues ranging from basic participatory land-use planning, negotiation skills, contract management, marketing, proposal writing, democracy and local governance etc.

These proposals can actually be implemented within the existing legal framework. These initiatives are already being implemented in some parts of the country, especially in Southern Province of Zambia, where there is a lot of demand for land for tourism investments. Examples include the Mbeza Royal Development Trust, Sekute Trust, and the Mukuni Development Trust. Figure 2 illustrates the organisational structure of the Sekute Trust. Sekute Chiefdom covers an area of 250,000 hectares with an estimated 2,900 households (17,500 people); 289 villages and 15 areas. All members of the community are entitled to membership through village and area committees and chiefdom level boards (Metcalf, 2005).

FIGURE 2: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SEKUTE TRUST



Source: Metcalfe (2005)

The organisational structure of the Sekute Trust gives it sufficient legal authority to enter and sign agreements, acquire permits and enter into contracts with investors. Holding of the whole or part of customary land on lease by the Trust and partnering or sub-leasing to investors empowers communities to be in control of the land and reduces the risk of land grabbing (ibid.). Downward accountability in this structure is achieved through Annual General Meetings and/or General Assemblies of members (Ribot & Larson 2005; Sekute Trust 2003, cited in ibid.: 8). There is evidence of how this alternative proposal of community land trusts has helped poor communities challenge land grabbing by investors. This was demonstrated in Sekute Chiefdom when the Trust legally challenged a private investor who had unscrupulously claimed ownership of a prime island on the Zambezi River within the Chiefdom. This legal challenge was achieved with support from Africa Wildlife Foundation (AWF). The community has since repossessed the island (Metcalf, 2005).

A number of traditional leaders in other parts of the country have expressed interest to adopt such initiatives. However, there is not much documentation on how these initiatives are operating and what challenges they face.

Raising communities' awareness of their land rights is yet another proposal that could empower communities to challenge and hold their traditional leaders accountable on questionable land transactions that cause land grabs. The current low levels of awareness of land rights by poor families contribute to land grabs that take place without any legal challenge. These land rights could be further strengthened if local land policies and laws recognise them and even provide institutional arrangements for seeking legal redress in the event of land rights violations. However, strong mechanisms for redressing land rights violations and land disputes are required. The new Lands Tribunal Act of 2010 is a step in the right direction as this has broadened the jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal to cover land disputes involving legal titles in customary areas unlike before where its jurisdiction was restricted to state land.

Proposals for securing legal title to land and livelihoods for poor families

In Zambia, most poor rural families living in customary areas currently still have access to agriculture land. However, the major challenge is lack of land ownership, limited land sizes¹ and capacity to fully utilise the land to meet food and income requirements. Most poor families lack financial, technical (extension information and farming technology) and material (agriculture inputs) capacity to fully utilise their land to maximise income and food gains. Most of these factors affect disproportionately women or female headed households, leading to low production and productivity. The other challenge is that most of the land where poor families cultivate is not secured in form of legal title due to the many obstacles highlighted in the preceding section. This makes poor families more vulnerable to land grabs and displacements.

However, the legal title to land (title deed) in its current form would not be the best option of securing land rights for poor families in Zambia unless all the obstacles outlined above are sufficiently addressed. The easier option would be the introduction of cost-effective but legally recognised customary land titles. Implementing this proposal, however, requires formalising customary land administration institutions and building their

capacities to effectively undertake this task. Capacity is required in basic land administration, focusing on sustainable or participatory ecological land use-planning, land registration and records management, and strengthening already existing land disputes resolution mechanisms to make them more impartial, effective and gender sensitive. Sustaining this formalised land administration system in customary areas would require families seeking land to pay a minimal administrative fee. In addition, there is need to assist customary authorities to develop minimum standards or guidelines for land administration. This is to avoid the current confusing and diverse nature of customary norms and practices applied from one place to the other, which sometimes acts as an obstacle to land acquisition. A few traditional leaders are implementing this initiative in various parts of the country with the support of non-governmental organisations such as Zambia Land Alliance and Action Aid Zambia. The initiative has received overwhelming support by many traditional leaders and poor families in rural areas. However, the lack of legal recognition of these customary land titles or certificates still remains a challenge, until legal reforms are undertaken to accommodate this alternative proposal.

The advantage of these simple cost-effective but legally recognised customary land titles is that they would not only serve as proof of ownership of land but would also increase access of poor families to micro-credit to help boost their agricultural production and productivity.

Considering the obstacles that poor families face to obtain credit due to lack of legal title to land (for use as collateral), other alternatives such as the Warehouse Receipt System can be explored. The new Agriculture Act of 2010 is one such legal reform that seems to be promising in terms of increasing borrowing by smallholder farmers without using land as collateral. Once the Credit Act of 2010 is operational, smallholder farmers will be able to borrow from commercial banks and other credit institutions using warehouse receipts based on the quantity and quality of their agriculture produce (grain) deposited in certified warehouses across the country.

Proposals for reducing effects of increasing food prices

Reducing the effects of rising global prices for food commodities requires investment in increased local production by supporting smallholder farming. This support should be directed towards securing their land rights and tenure security, increasing their productive capacities through agriculture input support coupled with effective financing, extension and research support, and developing local and regional markets. Increased production and productivity levels would help reduce the

¹Although there is a huge gap in the sizes of land holdings of smallholder farmers in Zambia, the national average is 2.25ha for cultivated and fallow land and 3.27ha for all land including virgin and rented land (Jayne et al., 2008).

prices of staple food crops on the market and would help build up food reserves.

The agriculture marketing programme also faces many challenges, which includes inefficient and ineffective purchases of produce and management of bumper harvests due to inadequate storage infrastructure and transport facilities especially in remote parts of the country. The transport challenge leads to wastage of most of the produce and in some areas leads to exploitation of peasant farmers by traders who take advantage of the absence of the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) to suppress the prices to below the official floor price set by government. The wastage and low price of maize crop reduces poor families' incomes and undermines their overall food security. One alternative of reducing wastage is to develop regional markets around Southern and Eastern Africa. These regional markets have great potential to absorb excess grain or bumper harvests owing to natural calamities which severely affect some countries' food output. However, regional markets can only be developed through strong regional integration, which is currently being threatened by EPAs which are designed to split-up existing regional blocks like the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

C. HOW EU TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY WILL UNDERMINE ALTERNATIVES

Apart from splitting up existing regional blocks, the opening up of markets under EPAs will disrupt local and regional markets by flooding the local market with cheap EU agricultural products, thus negatively affecting production, as well as local and regional marketing of agri-products by smallholder farmers (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004). This reduced production among smallholder farmers will undermine alternative proposals to reduce land grabs because the underutilisation of land is often used as justification to grab land and allocate it to investors who have the capacity to fully utilise it.

EU trade and investment policy will also undermine alternative proposals to secure land justice for the poor because these trade agreements strengthen the legal power of investors while weakening the policy space of governments and the power of host local communities (Bertow and Schultheis, 2007). This undermines the introduction and implementation of progressive land policy and legal reforms aimed at empowering poor families, especially with their emphasis on liberalisation of land markets and protection of investors. This also undermines alternatives to strengthen communities' voices or legal power to hold both their governments and investors accountable for actions that cause land rights violations, land grabs, and displacements.

The ultimate goal of alternatives to empower poor families with legal title to land is to ensure improved or stable livelihoods and increased household food security and incomes. However, achieving this goal is seriously undermined by unregulated FDI in agriculture as advocated by trade agreements. This is because of the dangerous disconnect between FDI in agriculture, which often involves taking over land in poor countries, and the goal of securing food security for poor and vulnerable populations in the host countries (Daniel and Mittal, 2009). Investment in large cash crop monocultures has severe impacts on the availability of food for many poor households, especially female headed, as this diverts their food producing resources and labour for cash crop production (Graham et al., 2010: 8). It is argued that more sustainable food security of poor households can only be achieved if food production takes place on their land (ibid.). The high dependency on food produced from elsewhere reduces the quality and variety of diet of communities and alters their food customs (ibid.). Even the jobs created by these investments do not help increase income and food security due to the low quality and conditions offered by many investors.

The EU trade policies will also undermine alternatives

aimed at increasing access of poor farmers to credit such as the Warehouse Receipt System and the issuance of traditional land titles or certificates. This is because of the increased competition for credit resulting from liberalisation of markets. Increased competition for credit among different borrowers often disadvantages the poor who have little collateral options for obtaining credit. Under high competition for credit, traditional land titles which are not legally recognised at the moment would be unattractive to use as collateral by lenders, rendering them less useful.

Large-scale land investment in agriculture, particularly agro-fuels, also threatens communities' access to water, since production of agro fuel crops such as jatropha requires high water input (*ibid.*). This competition for productive resources such as fertile land and water unleashed by trade agreements such as EPAs, is leading to increasing prices for land and water, putting them beyond the reach of many poor families especially in rural areas.

The other impact of open trade in developing countries like Zambia is reduced government revenue from trade tariffs. This has undermined public investment in agriculture and rural development. Currently, the Zambian government is under-funding the agriculture sector, below the 10% of the total national budget which is a minimum requirement set by the African Union through the Maputo Declaration of 2003. This low level of investment reduces availability of resources to support key drivers of agriculture growth such as research and extension, rural infrastructure development (roads and storage facilities), irrigation, water and soil management. It has also led the government to direct the huge chunk of the agricultural budget to the highly politicised subsidy programme for staple food (i.e. maize) production and marketing. This level and type of public investment in agriculture will continue undermining achievement of crop diversification and sustainable levels of agricultural growth necessary to increase household food security and shield poor families from rising food prices.

The loss of tariff revenue has also meant that the government lacks the necessary means to build the capacity of traditional authorities to improve customary land administration. Customary land in Zambia constitutes the largest and most diverse land tenure system in nearly all rural and remote parts of the country. However, at the moment, there are no deliberate policies to improve its administration. Alternatives of improving customary land administration such as developing culturally acceptable minimum standards or guidelines in addition to provision of basic equipment and training of traditional leaders in basic land administration requires huge public investments. The needed resources,

however, cannot be mobilised locally due to the effect of reduced revenue caused by trade liberalisation.

Finally, the huge investments in the industrial mode of production involving FDI in agriculture is often associated with negative ecological consequences, which includes loss of fertile top soils due to erosion, biodiversity loss, and environmental pollution due to intensive cropping and over-application of agro-chemicals (FAO, 2001). In addition, the strict EU requirements on meeting trade standards are forcing a shift from smallholder model to large-scale farming, as the latter model is in a better position to guarantee these standards than the former (Bertow and Schultheis, 2007: 27). This shift has far reaching consequences on the environment and land tenure rights of the poor who are often faced with land displacements to pave way for large commercial investments in agriculture. Environmental degradation also reduces the market-value and productivity of land, which in turn reduces incentives for poor families to obtain legal title to land, thus ultimately undermining alternatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Below are a series of recommendations at an international and national level, in order to improve access to land and land rights in Zambia.

The EU should:

- Reform its trade and investment policies and adopt guidelines for responsible trade and investments such as the FAO Voluntary Guidelines (VG) and RAI initiatives in order to minimise the impacts of EU trade policies on land rights and livelihoods of poor families;
- Create space in trade negotiations for civil society and farmer organisations to increase voices of the poor and smallholder farmers;
- Increase financial aid targeted at improving infrastructure, land tenure and administration, agriculture and rural livelihoods in poor countries like Zambia. This would reduce poverty and impacts of EU trade policies on the poor in rural areas;
- Support research and adoption of alternatives such as the Warehouse Receipt System that allow poor families access to credit without using land as collateral;
- Continue working with poor communities in exploring practical or workable cost-effective alternatives or proposals that would increase access of poor families to legal title and improve livelihoods in customary areas;
- Create awareness of land rights among poor families and provide monitoring and support mechanisms to poor families who are victims of land grabs and displacements;
- Step-up campaign and advocacy for pro-poor national land policy and legal reforms to address obstacles poor families face in accessing and obtaining legal title to land;
- Strengthen their social capital to effectively mobilise themselves and consolidate their position to hold traditional leaders, government and investors accountable and challenge injustices they suffer from the advent of FDI and land grabs or displacements;
- Support and work with civil society and NGOs in campaign and advocacy initiatives that aim to address the impacts of EU trade and investment policies on land rights and livelihoods of poor families.

The Zambian government should:

- Formulate a comprehensive land policy and undertake legal reforms with a pro-poor focus in order to address the many obstacles faced by poor families in accessing legal title to land including formalisation and recognition of customary land titles;
- Increase public investment in agriculture and rural development in accordance with the Maputo Declaration of 2003/ Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) principles in order to increase household food security and shield poor families from increasing food prices;
- Develop local minimum trade and investment guidelines including monitoring mechanisms aimed at increasing consultations, accountability, benefits and reducing impacts of FDI on host communities;

Civil society and NGOs should:

- Continue voicing out the concerns and plight of poor families in EU trade policy negotiations and if possible build their capacities to voice out in international platforms on trade negotiations;

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