Civilian Perspective or Security Strategy?

European Development Policy Confronting New Challenges in Foreign and Security Policy
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European Development Policy Confronting New Challenges in Foreign and Security Policy

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>AidCo</td>
<td>Europe Aid Cooperation Office</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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| CEMAC        | Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa  
(French: Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale) |
| CFSP         | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CONCORD      | European NGOs Confederation for Relief and Development |
| DAC          | Development Assistance Committee of the OECD |
| DC           | Development Cooperation |
| DCECI        | Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument |
| DG           | Directorates-General |
| DG Dev       | Directorate-General Development |
| DG Relex     | Directorate-General External Relations  
(French: Relations Extérieurs) |
| DPS          | Development Policy Statement |
| DRC          | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| EC           | European Community |
| ECDPM        | European Centre for Development Policy Management |
| ECHO         | European Community Humanitarian Office |
| EDF          | European Development Fund |
| EDSP         | European Defense and Security Policy |
| EEAS         | European External Action Service |
| EEC          | European Economic Community |
| EFM          | European Foreign Minister |
| ESS          | European Security Strategy |
| EU           | European Union |
| EU-15        | the former 15 EU Member States |
| EU-25        | the 25 EU Member States |
| EuropeAid    | Europe Aid Cooperation Office |
| EUROSTEP     | European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People |
| GAERC        | General Affairs and External Relations Council |
| GDP          | Gross Domestic Product |
| GNP          | Gross National Product |
| GRIP         | Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité |
| GSP          | Gross Social Product |
| IAEO         | International Atomic Energy Organisation |
| ICC          | International Criminal Court |
| JCC          | Joint Coordination Committee of the African Union Commission and  
the European Commission |
| JHA          | Justice and Home Affairs |
| LDCs         | Least/Less Developed Countries |
| MEDA         | EU programme for cooperation with Mediterranean countries  
(French: Mesures d’Accompagnement Financières et Techniques) |
| MERCOSUR     | Southern Common Market  
(Spanish: Mercado Común del Cono Sur) |
| MDGs         | Millennium Development Goals |
| NAO          | National Authorising Office |
| NATO         | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NGDOs        | Non-Governmental Development Organisations |
| NGOs         | Non-Governmental Organisations |
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity (French: Organisation de l’Unité Africaine)</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONU</td>
<td>United Nations (French: Organisation des Nations Unies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUA</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNUD</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (French: Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement)</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relex</td>
<td>External Relations (French: Relations Extérieurs)</td>
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<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Communities</td>
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<td>UE</td>
<td>European Union (French: Union Européenne)</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>VENRO</td>
<td>Association of German Development Non-Governmental Organisations (German: Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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Foreword

With the beginning of the new century European development policy faces new challenges due to redefined European foreign and security interests. Military interventions in situations of crisis and conflict are increasing and shape the cooperation between development and security policy actors. The European Security Strategy (ESS) signed in December 2003 and the Treaty for a new European Constitution are providing the revised strategic framework by identifying new threats to security and defining the common interests and objectives of EU foreign policy.

European development policy currently faces strategic challenges in outlining its position and activities vis-à-vis the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Increasingly development action is measured against its contribution to the common foreign, economic and security interests of the enlarged EU. Therefore, development policy has to underline its comparative strengths in providing country expertise and operational experience to position itself as an independent player amongst other foreign policies. No other policy field compares to its vast experience in civil conflict prevention and the stabilization of societies in crisis. In order to remain politically independent development policy needs to change conceptually and institutionally as well as to increase its coherence and efficiency. The future role of development policy will depend on the outcomes of the political re-orientation as expressed i.e. by the presentation of the EU Commission proposal for a new Development Policy Statement in July 2005.

Following the inauguration of the new European Commission these questions have been discussed at a conference organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, terre des hommes and World Economy, Ecology & Development (WEED) in Berlin in November 2004 and are now reflected in the contributions to this documentation. It contains statements and documents presented at the Berlin conference as well as the European Security Strategy as reference document. With this publication we hope to contribute to the broadening of the public debate, to take stock of the policy changes affecting EU development policy and to examine the risks and benefits associated with a closer cooperation of development, foreign and security policy.

November 2004

Ralf Hexel, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
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Klaus Schilder, WEED
The European Security Strategy as a response to new challenges in EU foreign and security policy

Christoph Heusgen

The European Security Strategy is a new approach to European security policy. Never before has the European Union attended to a comparable project. The reasons for this are obvious. Prior to 1999, the European Union had either not been involved in security matters at all or if so, only marginally. It had not had a mandate regarding this policy area, and there had been a lack of political will to develop the security dimension of EU foreign policy. Generally, NATO had been seen as the leading organization assuring European security. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Iron Curtain changed the European coordinate system hitherto determined by the Cold War. The European Union took a long time to adapt to this historic change.

The way to the European Security Strategy

The Balkan War in the 1990ies bluntly revealed that the EU was not able to manage conflicts on its own continent. But 1999 constituted a dramatic change. Although the Kosovo War once again demonstrated European deficits concerning conflict management, it gave the final important impulse to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) deserving this name.

The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, which provided the basis for strengthening the CFSP, gave the signal to develop its instruments for active crisis management. The EU pursued this objective as from October 1999. The initial step for this progress was the French-British Summit in Saint Malo in December 1998, at which French President Jacques Chirac convinced UK Prime Minister Tony Blair of the need to establish a vigorous CFSP.

»Amsterdam« created the office of High Representative for CFSP. The first holder of this office, Javier Solana, succeeded very rapidly in giving face and voice to the CFSP. The funding of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the EU Military Staff created further institutional improvements for an effective European management in the area of foreign and security policy.

Within a short time, the EU became capable of acting. I would like to draw some concrete examples to mind. The highest political priority was given to the Balkans—Macedonia (2001) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2002) are two examples. Furthermore, the EU engaged widely in the Middle East. It also contributed significantly to the establishment of the so-called »Road Map« and is a member of the »quartet« today. Special Emissaries have been sent to Macedonia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Great Lakes region and Southern Caucasus. Thus, the EU is now represented in the field regarding critical countries and regions.

In the area of civil crisis management (police/law and justice), the EU has accomplished operations in Macedonia, Bosnia, Georgia and the Democratic Republic of Congo since 2003. Moreover, it is preparing a civil mission in Iraq. In addition, the EU was involved in military
operations in Macedonia, Bosnia and Congo and is currently engaged in Darfur with observers.

So no doubt the EU has become an active player in the field of foreign and security policy since the beginning of this century. The European population is backing this process, while non-member countries expect a more important EU role in dealing with conflicts. According to the Eurobarometer, the CFSP reaches highest levels relating to the question of which policy areas the EU population appreciates a stronger integration in. And as a confederation comprising 450 million people that gains a quarter of global GSP (Gross Social Product), constitutes the world’s largest economic power and represents the most important donor of development aid, the EU has no other choice but to assume global responsibility.

The European Security Strategy — a new framework for the EU’s foreign and security policy

Against the background of growing activities in the foreign and security area and taking into account the rising expectations vis-à-vis the EU, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was created in 2003. It was designed to set up the conceptual framework for the European acting in the field of foreign and security policy. The European Council adopted the document in December 2003. Today, it represents a sort of European «ideology» or, to put it in less sophisticated terms, instructions for acting in this policy area.

What are the main statements of the European Security Strategy? Its first part deals with the analysis of threats the EU is confronted with. Since the end of the Cold War, these threats have changed, too, with the omnipresent East-West conflict becoming replaced by more diffuse threat situations. In particular, the ESS identifies in terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional crises, failing states and organised crime. But further global challenges are mentioned, too: poverty, diseases, environmental destruction, etc. A number of states have entered a vicious circle of conflicts, insecurity and poverty.

The strategic objectives of the European Union

The second part of the ESS stresses the strategic objectives the EU claims to realise in order to defend European security and values.

First, the EU has to defend itself against concrete threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.).

Secondly, we have to consider reinforcing security in the neighbourhood of the EU (resulting from the fact that dangers occurring in bordering regions are particularly critical for the security of the EU (i.e. the Balkans, Near East and Mediterranean Sea, Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus).

Thirdly, the establishment of a world order based on effective multilateralism is the most significant earmark of the ESS. In a world of global threats, markets and media, Europe’s security and prosperity depend on a vigorous system of multilateralism. The United Nations, whose power has to be strengthened, forms the core of this system. The EU has to concentrate on keeping this system effective and making it more assertive, i.e. its rules have to be observed. Accordingly, Iran and its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Organisation (IAEO) is a litmus test for the EU’s policy approach. But regional organisations such as the OSCE, the AU, ASEAN and MERCOSUR belong to the multilateral system, too. Also, the WTO and the International Criminal Court (ICC) provide cornerstones of an efficient multilateralism.

Implications for acting

The final part of the ESS—and this refers directly to the principal topic of the conference—deals with the implications for EU policy resulting from the threats and strategic objectives described. The ESS resumes these implications in four key points. The EU has to get more active, more capable of acting and more...
coherent. Likewise it has to work closely with partners.

To start with the last point, crises in different parts of the world cannot be solved by one actor alone. Currently, the USA is experiencing this in the Iraq, and the Europeans, for their part, were not able to cope with the Balkan War independently. The crises in the Middle East, North Korea, Afghanistan and Africa demonstrate the validity of this assumption.

Secondly, we have to become more active. Given the challenges, the responsibility the EU holds but also instruments that are at its disposal, it has to get more involved in crisis management. It is a key point to develop a strategic culture within the EU that provides early, rapid and—when necessary—robust engagement. In this context, preventive rather than pre-emptive engagement is the crucial principle.

Moreover, the EU has to strengthen its capacities. This means a further build-up of military and civil instruments concerning crisis management. Often this requires better focusing of already existing capabilities rather than additional money.

Finally, we need more coherence. In recent years, the EU has developed a number of different instruments, each with its own structures and logic. Now, the challenge is to connect these different capabilities and instruments. The instruments comprise political and diplomatic as well as military and civil dimensions of crisis management. The European aid programmes and the European Development Fund are part of this toolbox, too. All these instruments influence European security and the security situation abroad. And security remains the most important condition for development. The situation in Iraq clearly illustrates this core ESS statement. The ESS concludes that diplomatic efforts and all external policy areas (development, trade, environment, etc.) have to follow the same agenda. Especially in times of crises, consistent guidance is a fundamental must. However, coherence relates not only to the application of the EU’s instruments but also to the EU Member States’ instruments. They have to accept the same guidelines among themselves and in relation to the EU to achieve an optimal impact.

The European Constitution and the relationship between security and development

The European Constitution accommodates the postulates of the ESS. In particular, it allows for the establishment of the European Foreign Minister and—for his support—a European External Service. At present we are at an early stage of considerations concerning the implementation of this innovative part of the Convention. Formally, Javier Solana, already the designated first European Foreign Minister, has to present a proposal for the structure of the European External Service, directly after the entry into force of the Convention. Our internal considerations are as follows: It indeed has to be ensured that the capabilities of the EU are focused, that they follow the same agenda and that they offer more coherence. The future European Foreign Minister combines the roles of the President of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative of the CFSP. In order to support the Foreign Minister, the European External Service will comprise members of the previous staff subordinated to Javier Solana, officials from the Member States and the relevant offices of the Commission, including its approximately 125 delegations in countries abroad.

What implications are to be awaited for development policy? In our point of view, the office of the Commissioner responsible for development issues should be preserved. Issues concerning development policy are still part of the EU agenda, while the future Foreign Minister would be overstretched if he had to assume the responsibilities currently held by the Development Commissioner in addition to the roles mentioned above. But the Foreign Minister will have to fulfil the important task of coordination. Inside the European External Service, there should be only one geographical department for each country and region, ensuring thereby the necessary coherence of EU’s external action. This department has to do the preliminary work for the Foreign Minister as well as the Development Commissioner and the future President of the European Council.
**Conclusion:**

**The need for coherence**

There are many examples of a lack of coherence within the EU's foreign action. However, when this action is effective, for instance in Macedonia in 2001, then this tends to be the case in spite of and not due to the current provisions. Since the EU plays an active role in Africa, especially in Congo, in Sudan and vis-à-vis the African Union, the necessity of a stronger coherence in this region becomes obvious, too. Only by focusing its different powers can the EU to act effectively and fulfil the expectations of European citizens as well as those of countries abroad. Finally, this is the only way to develop itself as an equal partner concerning the transatlantic relationship.
Security policy is ranking high on the agenda. This has effects on development policy. Development cooperation has (a) gained attention from a security point of view and (b) claims to have something to offer to stability and security in the world. Where are possible links and how should development and security be interacting? European Common Foreign and Security Policy made substantial progress last year. In December 2003, the EU heads of state agreed on an overarching strategy paper as a starting point for strategic thinking. This European Security Strategy (ESS)—carrying the ambitious title »A secure Europe in a better world«—has some points to offer and some flaws from the development perspective. The ESS speaks of security as »a precondition for development«. At the same time, it omits that the inverse is also true (development as a precondition for security). This should not be a discussion about »either or« or securitisation of development policy. In the ESS, one finds—in Joseph Nye’s terms (cf. idem 2004)—provisions for hard and soft power. The ESS is quite comprehensive. There are rather central links to the issue of tackling poverty—an issue that is acknowledged as one of the »main challenges« for European security. There are avenues opened up for the notion of »human security« as opposed to »state security« in the ESS. And one central message of importance to partner countries is »making multilateralism work«, i.e. engaging with their views.

Brief history of EU links between security and development

European integration was and is a project for conflict prevention in the region. In order to retain European achievements in the 21st century, however, Europe has to change its perspective. The world has moved on, and so should Europe. We have become more interconnected, and need answers to problems beyond the European region if, having institutionally ensured a fifty-year period of peace for our part of the world, successful integration is to remain valid and justified. One crucial question around the foundation of the EEC was how to organise its interaction with the external world. Alongside the question of market access for the then colonies of founding members, the starting point was the limited pooling of resources in development assistance, the EDF (European Development Fund), in 1958. However, this pool was deliberately kept marginal, i.e. out of reach for the EEC institutions and the common policy process (cf. Grimm 2004).

Since its foundation, the EC has continuously changed and integration has become more profound in some areas (e.g. the common market and trade policy) and started covering new issues (e.g. consumer protection, environment, etc.). Successive enlargements have spread »the European model« of policy-making across Europe. Since 1993, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has seen further development and Defence and Security Policy (EDSP) has moved up the agenda, particularly since 1998. Further integration in these two policy areas is mostly a European response to changes in the increasingly globalised world—Europe is as much a driving force of globalisation as it is a European answer to this global trend, as illustrated by the Common Market.

Should the European level engage in development policy at all?

The EC started as an Economic Community; therefore, its main concern was the economic integration of Europe (for the purpose of peace in Europe). This is an inward-looking perspective. Particularly in the 1980s, the focus of attention was the creation of a single European market. However, creating the single market has its effects on the outside world—and more so for some parts of the world than for others. Washington and Moscow can be quite certain to make
themselves heard in Brussels (or national capitals), but not so the vast majority of developing countries (not just for lack of power, but also for lack of capacity to engage with the several areas there are!). A well-known example for wide-ranging consequences in the creation of a single market is the integration of the Banana import regime—with its considerable impact on the developing world. The next similar issue currently on the agenda is the sugar market reform. So even without foreign policy ambitions, the EU has to address concerns of partners in the world beyond Europe—the question is not if, but how we want to interact with developing countries. This is a point to make about the intrinsic value of European development cooperation.

**Changes in the world impact on development cooperation**

Even though development policy was the starting point of EU interaction with the external world, it always was a niche topic. It was largely kept apart from foreign policy. After integration setbacks in the 1950s and 1960s, it was agreed that foreign policy was too sensitive an issue to be dealt with by 'Brussels'; foreign policy touches on the core functions of nation states. At that time, development cooperation was apparently understood as aid and technical assistance. In the 1980s, the then EC Commissioner for Development was proud to say that Europe’s assistance was 'non-political' (cf. Grilli 1993), that is, it claimed to not interfere with so-called 'high-level' politics.

To illustrate the profound changes of the last 15 years or so, two symbolic events should be recalled: the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the Cold War, and the 11th September 2001 was the starting point for the 'War on Terror'. These events had truly far-reaching effects on interaction between different states, including the aspect of development policy. The National Conference in Benin in 1989 marked a change in the dynamics in the developing world and stood at the beginning of democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa (even if the mid-term results of it were not as bright as initially hoped for). In the 1990s, the 'second wind of change' also shook the tops of the coconut palms, as Gabon's President Omar Bongo put it (cf. Grimm 2003). It became obvious that development cooperation was about making political choices at our end as well—whether deliberately or not. By transferring resources to Southern countries and deciding on the partners for cooperation, Northern donors have an impact on the local struggle for resources and power; albeit with a limited involvement and restricted leverage. This is not an entirely new discovery for the development community—as 'development is change—but it took time to fully sink in and trigger a political discussion. Opinion polls show that the linkages are understood by a vast proportion of the European population: When asked about the threats they fear most, European citizens first mention 'Terrorism' (71%) and then 'Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)' (64%), while the imbalance between rich and poor countries (49%) is in third position.

**EU interactions with the developing world — Policies on development and security**

Humanitarian assistance should be a notable exception in the political discussion, as the association with a political agenda endangers the core principle of humanitarian interventions of being non-partial. Recent conflicts such as Afghanistan and, more so, Iraq pose a threat to the perception of humanitarian assistance based on needs of the population and irrespective of the political regime. This is a very distinct debate; 'humanitarians' had best be eclipsed by political discussion—regarding this point, the European Security Strategy needs clarification. But I will come to the Security Strategy further below.

If a link between foreign and development policy is acknowledged, what are their respective characteristics? Crudely speaking, the time horizons are different. Development aims at long-term and sustainable changes in the social and economic patterns. Foreign policy is much more intermediary in that it aims at management of political processes in conflict situations, ideally also with a sustainable long-term strategy. However, in practice, the schedule of Foreign Ministries is chronically overcrowded. Much of foreign policy is busy with conflict management rather than conflict prevention or rehabilitation in post-conflict situations.

Development policy, on the other hand, is more than aid or Official Development Assistance (ODA). It means enabling developing countries to transform themselves. It does include elements of trade policy and foreign policy (i.e. human rights concerns and advocating values in a political dialogue). However, the central political debate in each of these policy areas is about our concerns (our
trade relations, our security, etc.) Development policy should accompany these very important discussions in representing the Southern perspective at the (cabinet) table, i.e. adding the perspective of effects of our choices on our partners to the debate. In brief, development policy should be about them. Partnership and ownership are guiding principles in development, even though they are not always fully respected as such. Following these principles, development will have a distinct perception of problems and needs to be kept autonomous from other policy areas.

**Conclusion:** linkages and borderlines

The above observations concern the practice in the field. From the general principles, we can draw practical conclusions for cooperation between development and foreign/security policy at several levels:

At the **conceptual level:** A certain degree of security is the first condition for meaningful engagement in development processes. However, a certain degree of development will be necessary for societies to tackle security challenges on their own behalf. Development is a policy area in its own right, with its own principles and instruments—and with intermediary effects on security situations. Our efforts must exceed aid and ought to attempt to include an external perspective of our actions. Development policy does not seek to replace security policy, which has its strengths in conflict situations. Development policy, on the other hand, should argue its case, but not have regional fiefdoms; elements of the policy towards Africa need to come from other policy areas. In non- or post-conflict situations, however, it might create capacity on the ground for conflict resolution within societies and thus act as conflict prevention. This is mostly beyond headlines, but nonetheless equally important.

At the **level of EU institutions:** Europe needs a Development Commissioner. EU Commission President Barroso has maintained the separation between the posts of Commissioners for External Relations and Development. This is to be welcomed. However, the post of Development Commissioner will need to be strengthened. The Development Commissioner will need to have a political mandate for development policy beyond the ACP and should be in charge of im-

At the **level of international institutions:** Europe should improve coordination, e.g. in multilateral fora, such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN.
Joint strategies could provide a rallying point for better coordination of Member State endeavours with policies pursued at the European level by different Directorates-General. This will take time, but it is necessary for early analysis of challenges for Europe and its partners. The consultation of developing countries via partnership institutions could be one way of better linking these strategies to development needs—or engaging in a discussion on what development changes.

At the level of partner countries: In particular, strategic planning at country level (i.e. country strategy papers) might be very helpful in finding the right policy mix across portfolios. At the same time, development policy should not claim omnipotence—we shouldn’t stretch the agenda too much in either direction, but rather ought to aim at coordinating different agendas. On-the-spot coordination might be desirable in individual cases (e.g. Afghanistan) but depends on a clear mandate by the international community, i.e. the United Nations. This is fully in accordance with the ESS (effective multilateralism).

At the financial level: Financing non-civilian issues via development funds is not the right way to engage in countries. It will lead to a blurring of the picture. Issues like the African Peace Facility (i.e. spending development funds on the creation of African peacekeeping capacity)2 are laudable—but it is very doubtful whether this is development policy. The same goes for Operation Artemis in Bunia/Ituri in the DR Congo. Funding for foreign policy issues should be accounted for as foreign policy instead of being taken from the development pot.

Linkages between autonomous policy areas are obvious, and Europe needs to improve its coordination and the coherence of its activities. We should keep in mind that we are having a discussion about coherence—we are not discussing subservient relations between security and development. At European and national level alike, the discussion is about improving coordination among policy areas. In an interconnected world, our self-interest should be enlightened, i.e. take into account the concerns and interest of developing countries, so as to truly »make multilateralism work«. Our partners have a right to a predictable behaviour even of the complex beast Europe. This demands adequate use of tools, including security issues as a latecomer at the European level. We should welcome that. However, in the words of the former Head of EC Delegation in Washington, Günther Burkhardt, it is good to include the hammer to our (European) ›toolbox‹, but not every problem is a nail.

Endnotes


2 For further information see Box 2.
3. Discussion

The EU’s future role in Africa

At the beginning of the discussions, Christoph Heusgen underlined the growing support for African issues at European level. Within five years, Javier Solana’s staff dealing with Africa grew from only one person to a Task Force comprising five members. At the centre of activities stand the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, but growing importance will be given to Somalia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast, too. Mr. Heusgen observes an increasing willingness to cooperate at the Member States level, especially concerning the traditional colonial powers like France and the UK. This change stems from the shared point of view that most conflicts in Africa cannot be resolved by one actor alone. It results in a more proactive EU role in the field of crisis management. Therefore, the EU is becoming a more important actor in Africa. Concerning future military operations, he recommended mainly African solutions.

Sven Grimm added that the African Union itself was in favour of a stronger partnership between Africa and Europe and the provision of European expertise. In many African countries the attitudes towards former colonial powers are two-edged. While they are interested in maintaining a special relationship with them, they fear neo-colonial influence. Relating to interventions in Africa, Ivory Coast constitutes a classic example. A European actor has a special relationship with an African country and intervenes, backed by a UN mandate, which has to be the fundamental precondition for an intervention. One should accept these interventions as a European engagement. Otherwise, no other actor might be disposed to engage in these conflicts. Moreover, French intervention in Ivory Coast was not guided by neo-colonial interests. Concerning Africa, the influence of EU Eastern enlargement remains ambiguous. Only the larger EU Member States are interested in specific regions outside Europe, whereas small countries concentrate on their direct neighbourhood. Within the EU-25, the number of small states has grown to 19, which means that the relation between bigger and smaller states has changed. Raising interest for Africa in Eastern European countries will be a difficult task. Mr. Grimm supposes that not all Member States will engage in all regions automatically. In fact, particular countries will take a leading role, as France did in Congo.

Coherence between development and security

The discussions were guided by an overwhelming consensus that development and security are interdependent. The success of long-term development programmes is put at risk in insecure environments. Concerning this matter, Christoph Heusgen mentioned Gaza and Darfur. In Sven Grimm’s view, many crisis situations cannot be resolved by one policy area alone. The case of Afghanistan has revealed that military engagement needs to be supported more and more by development policy approaches, in order to ensure long-term security by providing infrastructure, the integration of different groups into society, etc. Europe has to find the right policy mix. To achieve a valid division of labour, the EU must choose the appropriate elements from its toolbox. «We should keep in mind that there are different levels of intervention, and we have to find solutions to varying problems. In this context, each policy area provides different approaches and advantages.»

Coherence must not mean the subordination of development under security aspects. Both policy areas have to act together as equal partners. This requires a Development Commissioner who is in charge of all measures belonging to Official Development Assistance according to the definition of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Mr. Grimm added. Consequently, the Development Commissioner should be strengthened by extending his responsibilities to other regions as Latin America or South Asia.2
Institutional provisions for enhancing coherence

Christoph Heusgen gave a positive outlook on future cooperation between military and civil peacekeeping capacities. «I believe that the European Union has the unique opportunity to learn from its experiences and to shape a coherent framework for the integration of civil and military instruments.» The EU engagements in Bosnia and Macedonia are good examples of a mutual strengthening of both areas. The office of the EU Special Representative, who is responsible for the civil as well as the military area, represents a helpful instrument. Starting in 2005, a new military-civilian planning unit will be established. The unit’s task is to actively engage in the preparation of operations. It consists of members of the EU military staff and experts from the civil sector (police officers, lawyers, civil observers). At the same time, we have to connect this unit to the area of conflict prevention. The EU Watchlist, which analyses the situation in international conflict regions, will be a helpful instrument. The unit is to become active at an early stage of increasing conflicts and develop a policy approach that takes measures in both areas into account. In this context, the EU Constitution’s provisions to establish only an EU Foreign Minister, but not a Minister of Defence, are important to note. The military element is just one of the Foreign Minister’s options.

Mr. Heusgen stressed the importance of the EU Foreign Minister in enhancing coherence within Europe’s external relations. The office is designated to combine the Vice-presidency of the European Commission, i.e. coordination of external relations within the Commission and between the different Directorates-General, and the Presidency of the General Council for External Relations under one umbrella. Since the equal coexistence of the different areas of the EU’s external relations (foreign and security policy, trade, development policy) is a core provision of the EU Constitution, the European Foreign Minister has to be seen as a coordinator and not as someone who decides about the whole agenda, Sven Grimm pointed out. He can only focus the discussions between the different policy areas, rather than replacing them. Within the new framework, separate policy areas have to develop common strategies.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) will be established in order to assist the EU Foreign Minister, but other Directorates-General within the Commission like environment or development will have direct access to the External Service, too. Concerning the future relationship between the European and the national services, Christoph Heusgen emphasised the need for a strong participation of the Member States. «If we want to gain credibility in the Member States and to assure that Member States regard the EEAS as a part of its own service, we have to follow the principle of ownership by strengthening their influence.» Foreign policy is a core element of national sovereignty. Therefore, the new service will be composed in equal parts by officials from Brussels and the Member States.

Coherence between Brussels and the Member States

Developing common European strategies with specific priorities towards other countries or regions represents a difficult and time-consuming process because of diverging interests among the different European actors. Hence, Europe needs to state its objectives. According to Sven Grimm, one of the European Security Strategy’s main values is that of addressing this issue. Moreover, the set of already adopted Common Strategies at European level—for example concerning sustainable development—as well as the Development Policy Statement by Council and Commission in 2000 provide criteria and instruments which positively influence European consensus building. Europe has to deepen these approaches to come to collective action. Without doubt, this process needs time, especially against the background of EU Eastern enlargement. «There are urgent problems, but we cannot provide an ad hoc answer. The Member States are following different agendas, and we have to find the right balance.»

Endnotes

1 Javier Solana is High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the European Council of Ministers.

2 Within the Barroso Commission, Development Commissioner Louis Michel is only responsible for cooperation with the ACP region, whereas the Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood is in charge of cooperation with all other world regions.
II. European development policy in the context of human and military security – objectives of strategic change

Francoise Moreau

EC development policy in the EU’s external action

The Treaty and the Joint Declaration by the Council and the Commission of November 2000 both provide the Community with an overall framework to guide its development cooperation with all developing countries. The 2000 Declaration aimed mainly at refocusing EC development policy on the objective of poverty reduction in line with the international agenda, and at identifying a number of priority areas for Community action, based on its value added and comparative advantages in relation to other multilateral or bilateral donors.

Since 2000, a number of events as well as new priorities have emerged which have an influence on development and make it necessary to review our Development Policy Statement with a view to possible adaptation.

First, we are now in an enlarged Europe, and we have a Draft Constitution which redefines the EU’s external action. The Constitution confirms that EC development cooperation policy is a policy in its own right, with the specific objective of eradicating poverty in the world, while also contributing to the general objectives of the external Union, including peace and international security, conflict prevention, the promotion of EU values, of human rights and democracy, etc.

Secondly, on the international stage, the adoption of the Millennium Declaration and the growing consensus and commitment to the achievement of the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) provide us with a common reference framework and a shared agenda. Progress towards the MDGs will be reviewed in 2005, at the level of the UN. The EU is committed to play a leading role in international actions and further initiatives needed to achieve the MDGs. The Commission, which has been mandated by the Council to prepare an EU synthesis report on the MDGs, is actively preparing proposals to this end.

Thirdly, the emergence of security issues of a new type and of international dimension have altered the international context and led to a number of questions regarding the role of development for peace and security, and the linkages between poverty, marginalisation, bad or weak governance and conflicts, terrorism or other forms of violence.

Reviewing EC development policy

In this new international and EU context, the Commission will soon launch a debate on EC development policy, identifying a number of issues which deserve a review or adaptations. The intention is not to call everything into question, since our policy remains anchored in the international commitments and founded on EU political and social values. For instance, the following issues may need to be reviewed:

- The 2000 Statement identified six focal areas for Community action (trade and development, regional integration and cooperation, support for macro-economic policies and the promo-
tion of equitable access to social services (health and education), transport, food security and sustainable rural development, institutional capacity building, good governance and the rule of law). While it certainly makes sense to maintain the principle of concentrating Community programmes at country level, for reasons of efficiency and impact, the opportunity to select a number of predefined areas can be questioned. It has proven very difficult to reconcile this principle of concentration on these six sectors, and the need to respond to evolving countries’ needs as well as to integrate new international or EU policy initiatives in our cooperation programmes.

- The way we operationalise the »3Cs principles« (coherence, coordination and complementarity) and in particular the way we work with (25) Member States. Progress has been made in the recent past in the debate on harmonisation between donors, and on efforts to better align policies and procedures with those of the partner countries, in the spirit of true partnership and for obvious reasons of efficiency and reducing the burden of multiple programming, monitoring and evaluation exercises imposed by donors on the recipient countries. The EU is committed to take concrete steps in this regard, and moves towards the use of common EU guidelines and ensuring better complementarity at country-level are under discussion. The Community can no longer be the 26th EU donor; it has to play a specific role in building common EU sectoral policies and mobilising EU’s weight in the international fora dealing with development-related issues.

- Finally, in the interpretation of the principle of »policy coherence«, the place and role of development cooperation in relation to other areas where the EU is progressively building a new policy agenda (security, migration policy, etc) deserve due attention and will be one of the key questions in the debate.

Questions related to security and development

Security and development are complementary agendas. To put it very simply: there can be no sustainable development without peace and security, and vice versa.

Long-term development cooperation is the best structural solution to address root causes of violent conflicts and the emergence of terrorism. Tackling poverty and inequality through an adequate level of development assistance is an essential component of any credible and effective security strategy which must not be limited to address the symptoms, but must pay attention to the real factors that undermine global, regional and in-coun-
Civilian Perspective or Security Strategy?

try security and lead to the emergence of failed states.

If we agree on this, it implies that funds for development assistance are crucial to long-term security. Therefore they cannot be diverted for other purposes. We must deliver on our commitments, and in particular contribute to the achievement of the MDG’s.

At the same time, we need to promote an integrated (security/development) policy mix supported by an appropriate instrument mix balancing short-term responses with long-term strategies. EC policies, in particular on conflict prevention, linking relief, rehabilitation and development, and on governance and development, are already good building blocks in this regard.

The Commission proposals on the Financial Perspectives for the period 2007-2013 go in this direction. Two new instruments have been proposed, »the Instrument for Stability« and the »Development and Economic Cooperation Instrument«. The idea is to establish a clear distinction between financial resources for development objectives and those used for other related security objectives. We have proposed an articulation between the two new instruments to reflect that in any given crisis/post-crisis situation there should be one single transition strategy per country involving two types of intervention in parallel, i.e., »stability« and »development cooperation« (including rebuilding State institutions, and the traditional rehabilitation activities that involve reconstruction of infrastructure, basic social services, etc.). The transition strategy should respect the principles of development policy. This means that the »geographical« programme should remain the central instrument while the Stability Instrument would complement it where necessary.

Including security concerns in our development policy framework also leads to seeking alternative approaches, for example in relation to the practice of concentrating aid resources on poor countries who are also good performers. The EU (Commission and Council) agreed, in the framework of last year’s discussions on »Governance and Development«, on the importance of remaining engaged even in the most difficult country situations for reasons of solidarity with populations, for long-term aid effectiveness, and also for reasons of security, linked to the dangers of isolating a country and leaving extremism and terrorism growing in these so-called »failed states«.

Finally, another important element in this debate is to avoid any tendency to create a hierarchy of policy areas, where development policy, or trade or other policy areas become subservient to overarching strategic security concerns. This relates, for example, to the discussion on political conditionality.

Conclusion

EC development policy needs to be adjusted to the international developments including crisis and security challenges since 2000 as well as to progress made in the international development debate. Development policy needs to be strengthened in the framework of more coherent external actions linking political strategies, security and development. But development policy as such needs to continue concentrating on its specific mandate and on its specific objectives. The Millennium Development Goals are set for 2015 and will remain the guiding objective for development.

Endnotes

1 Also known as Development Policy Statement.
5. Closing the gap between ambitions and reality—improving EC capacity to deliver on development and security policy

Jonas Frederiksen

Opportunities for development cooperation in more effective EU external action

The international context and the current political imperatives illustrate the need for the European Union (EU) to strengthen its capacities to implement its external policy objectives. Post 9/11 security concerns, WTO trade negotiations and multilateralism are key elements of the international context in which the EU is trying to act more quickly, better and more effectively. To do so, the EU has to make changes. For decades, the European Union has rightfully been nicknamed “an economic giant and a political dwarf.” The nickname reflects a reality which is still casting its shadows on the foreign policy ambitions of the European Union. The relatively high percentage of development assistance and the Union’s economic strengths, but also its obvious military and security weaknesses, partly justify continued use of the expression.

The EU cannot escape the many dynamics which require more effective EU actions abroad. Globalisation, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have brought soft and hard security concerns back to the forefront of the international agenda and resulted in new EU initiatives; renewed policy commitments and international conferences ensure that poverty and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are going to attain a prominent position on the political agenda in 2005; the Draft EU Constitution encourages more effective and coherent external policies; the establishment of a new European Foreign Minister (EFM) and the first real European diplomatic service (EEAS, European External Action Service) is being designed; the first EU security doctrine has celebrated its first anniversary, and the new European Commission is reviewing a number of external policies, particularly the 2000 Development Policy Statement (DPS). In parallel to these dynamics, all EU institutions are currently engaged in fierce negotiation of a new architecture for external assistance as part of the next budgetary framework (Financial Perspectives 2007-2013).

In various ways, these dynamics and policy initiatives are going to push the EU to improve its capacities to be an effective and efficient global partner. It is also these initiatives which attract public attention while the actual implementation of the various policy initiatives are often forgotten by the political decision-makers and the wider public. This is a pity, because the real challenges to an effective EU external action are not the overall objectives but, rather, two groups of implementation constraints:

- More coherence and synergies between the external policies and resources available is a must if the EU is to be taken seriously by its partners abroad. Limited progress within the EU institutions, and especially within the European Commission, has so far been achieved when it comes to mixing the different external policies in a manner which effectively pursues EU objectives in a certain country or region. It is widely recognised that the EU needs to have a number of policies and instruments on which it can rely and which it can mix appropriately to achieve the various policy objectives. There is, however, still a lot to do in operationalising the “policy mix.”

- Serious delivery constraints are limiting the effectiveness and results of EU external assistance. These implementation constraints include the procedures used to implement external assistance, the relatively limited human expertise in the EC services and the decision-making processes in the EU institutions.

Both these sets of constraints will have to be reduced if the EU is to be an effective partner. The following sections will go into more detail and identify some opportunities to overcome these challenges.
Improving the position of development policy in a effective EU policy mix

The origins of the difficult encounter between EU foreign policy and development policy began with the Maastricht Treaty twelve years ago. Maastricht, for the first time, gave a legal basis to EU development cooperation thus recognising the area as a fully fledged Community policy. At the same time, however, Maastricht created the CFSP.

Before Maastricht, the European Commission had built up a whole development cooperation programme focussed initially on the administration of the European Development Fund (EDF) but gradually expanding into a series of budget lines. The EC's development cooperation programme was therefore already well formed and had the 'luxury' of operating essentially on its own as the EC's only area of external action aside from trade. A 'luxury' because this relative isolation was not something enjoyed by the development cooperation programmes of most bilateral donors, all of which are concerned with their foreign policy and have long had to look at how their development cooperation squares with their foreign policy interests.

Since Maastricht, CFSP has evolved step by step and the Draft Constitution is launching a number of new innovations (e.g.: the 'double hatted' European Foreign Minister and a (joint) European External Action Service) to further improve decision making and consistency in this area.

We are therefore witnessing something of a 'historic' coming together of the two policy areas: CFSP is fighting for the space it clearly needs to operate effectively and in the process it is pushing, perhaps a bit too hard. Inevitably, development cooperation is resisting, unhappy about losing the primacy of its domain, reluctant to give ground, being protective about its financial resources. At the same time, development actors have a point: part of the relative success of the EC development cooperation was precisely that it was in some senses more 'apolitical' than aid from bilateral donors and that it could therefore focus more on the core development issues without having to worry unduly about foreign policy. ACP actors, for instance, traditionally saw the EC as a more reliable and constant partner whose policies would not change overnight simply because a national election in Europe had brought a change in government. The danger of losing a qualitative element in this shifting policy ground is therefore real and should be addressed if EU external action as a whole is not to be the loser.

This encounter between these two areas of policy is inevitable. There is therefore little option but to accept it. It should however be seriously debated because it raises fundamental issues about coherence, the meaning of the concept of policy mix and the quality of the EU's overall external action. The key question is how to turn this situation around and exploit the opportunities? Can this be done, and if so, how can we make the most of such opportunities?

Essentially, the answer lies in considering how each area of policy can take advantage of the opportunities offered by other policy areas. Identifying this would set up a dynamic where each area of policy recognises that it is better off if other areas operate effectively and that it is therefore in the interests of all to allow each sector the space it needs.

Such an approach to more coherent and effective external policies is also reflected in the draft EU Constitution. The Constitution clearly strengthens poverty reduction in third countries as one of the main objectives of the European Union. However, the days when development cooperation was only about solidarity and helping the poor people of the world are long gone. Indeed, it is questionable whether such a time ever really existed. But the Constitution clearly necessitates further linkages of the different foreign policy instruments available to the European Commission. Art. III-218 thus states that 'The Union policy in the sphere of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action'. In other words, there must be a better mix and synergy between external policies than is currently the case.

The requirement to more effectively mix external policies should not be seen as a threat to the independence of development cooperation but an opportunity to influence other external and internal policies which have a bigger impact on poverty than the money spent on development cooperation. Development cooperation needs to join forces with other external and internal EU policies to assist developing countries in making structural changes leading to reduction of poverty and sustainable development.

There is growing apprehension in the EU development community that the rise in European concerns with international security, coupled with the drive in the
Constitution to strengthen the operation of CFSP, will have negative effects on EU development cooperation. In particular, it is argued that CFSP is set to take precedence over development policies and that, in the absence of adequate funding for CFSP, demands for redirecting development funds into security projects will increase. The agreement to fund the new African Peace Facility from the EDF and moves in the DAC to re-categorise certain types of military costs as ODA do nothing to allay these fears. However, a purely defensive reaction does not deal adequately with the issue, so it is worth considering how one might develop a more sophisticated response.

The key is to advance and strengthen the concept of mixing external policies in a manner that advances multiple objectives abroad. The processes of establishing a synergy between external policies so that they strengthen each other is doable. Of course, there will be winners and losers from time to time. Development policy will have to give in now and then, but the requirement to more effectively blend the different instruments and policies available to the European Union does offer opportunities which should not be underestimated.

Ensuring that foreign policy takes advantage of development cooperation’s successes and vice versa should therefore be the way to make the closer interaction between the different external policies a win-win situation. A first step would be recognising that development cooperation is an important path towards reducing sources of international tensions and thereby increasing stability. The converse is also true: Development cooperation is strengthened by a foreign policy that can really deliver, by, for instance, enhancing security in places where it is needed for development work to be able to move forward. Such a mutual acknowledgement of benefits should then lead to the acceptance that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

How to achieve a better policy mix which alleviates poverty?

There are synergies to be achieved and possibilities for mutual support between the two policy areas of security and development policy which should be encouraged wherever possible. Exactly how this is done will vary from one situation to another, but an agreement on principle should first be reached at the overall level. Thereafter, it is vital to promote policy dialogue between stakeholders so as to achieve the appropriate policy mix for each set of circumstances.

The basis for this overall entente should probably rest on a number of key principles:

- Recognition of the important contribution that development cooperation can make to improving social stability and particularly in relation to conflict prevention, good governance and human security;
- Recognition that a better functioning set of external policies which improve the EU’s ability to take foreign policy measures quickly in times of tension would also help the development cooperation effort;
- Recognition that an integrated approach to promoting good governance is the best way to create stability required for both development and security;
- Recognising the crucial importance of establishing and reinforcing institutional mechanisms within and among the EU institutions. This is particularly important inside the European Commission, which needs to better use the opportunities available to promote the external objectives. Such mechanisms should be focused on the specific EU objectives in particular regions and not on whether security is or is not more important than development cooperation.

It is worth articulating clearly what development cooperation can offer foreign and security policy. The overall point is of course that poverty reduction strategies and socio-economic development policies directly address issues of wealth disparities and sources of social tension which in turn create instability. Development cooperation is therefore a prime tool for tackling the root causes of social instability.

More specifically, there are three areas where a lot of useful work that is clearly linked to security concerns has been done in development cooperation over the past years:

- Conflict prevention (& peace building): In policy terms this was addressed by the EU in the Göteborg Council in 2001 which endorsed a wide-ranging and well-articulated programme for EU action on conflict prevention. Much useful work has been
done since then in incorporating this into development cooperation programmes in parallel with the growing recognition that preventing conflict is not just about military solutions but also about effective social policies.

- **Promoting good governance.** This is another issue that is taken increasingly seriously both in EU development policies and by recipient governments. One of the lessons to learn about terrorism is that it is not just poverty that creates social instability, but also the lack of opportunities to express views and the absence of transparency, accountability and dialogue within the government. Promoting better governance and supporting practical steps to develop capacities in governance structures—parliaments, judicial systems, civil authorities—is a key instrument in reducing social tensions and has become a mainstream area within development cooperation.

- **Promoting human security** has become an important goal for development programmes. For individuals, development implies security at a personal level first in terms of basic needs, but also in terms of fundamental freedoms and an enabling environment in which all people can develop their own social and economic security.

One final area where EC officials have long-standing experience with and which could be of value in external relations is in the use of conditionality. The key lessons are, first that positive conditionality is often more effective than negative measures. Secondly, peer group pressure with locally generated benchmarking (e.g., as used in PRSPs, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) is generally far more effective than externally imposed conditionality. Local civil society compliance monitoring, for instance in the area of human rights and involvement in political dialogue, can be particularly valuable.

Policy debates and discussions about security and development are needed and beneficial but they remain highbrow declaration if the European Commission is not given the possibilities to strengthen its capacity to deliver. The efforts to create an effective policy mix must be coupled with strengthened delivery capacity inside the European Commission. This is the second major challenge which the Barroso Commission is facing.

**Improving EC capacity to deliver effectively on policy objectives**

If we listen to the people in developing countries, then we’ll hear that they don’t consider the security versus development debate as a major issue. It remains a discussion that attracts attention in Western capitals and in the policy discussions of donor organisations. In the streets of weak states or in post-conflict countries this policy debate is not something that attracts a lot of attention. What matters to these people is the contribution which the EU makes to establish better prospects for their lives. In other words, what matters to them is the capacity of the European Union to deliver on its commitments and objectives. It is thus very unfortunate that the delivery capacity remains an Achilles heel of the EU external relations.

The European Commission has made progress over the last few years and has little to be ashamed of when compared to other multilateral and bilateral donors. There is however still work to be done before the EC can claim to be amongst the most effective and efficient donors. A number of serious implementation constraints hinder the European Commission in realising the stated and agreed EU objectives:

- inadequate use of limited financial means and a lack of required human expertise within the EC services;
- inefficient organisational set-up of the European Commission;
- cumbersome implementing procedures;
- slow and inadequate decision-making processes in the three European institutions (European Commission, European Parliament and Council).³

The current structure of the EU budget, which splits the existing financial means into a web of instruments, limits the effect of the funds used on external assistance. The negotiations of the new Financial Perspectives (medium-term expenditure framework) could however result in a new structure which would allow the EU to improve the quality and effectiveness of its external assistance. Much depends on the current negotiations between the three EU institutions.

The budgetary negotiations, however, will not resolve the problems with limited human expertise in the European
Commission. While the devolution of decision-making powers and management from headquarter services in Brussels to EC delegations around the world has reduced the problems, the EC remains understaffed when compared to the EU Member States. Devolution will bring 2/3 of all EC staff handling external assistance into the EC delegations and thus move management and decision-making closer to the beneficiaries. Only 1/3 of the EC staff will remain in Brussels. There are good indications that devolution can make real improvements to the delivery of EC external assistance but more qualified EC staff is needed as is better use of existing headquarters staff. 

For years, the Commission’s external assistance has been hampered by the organisational setup and culture of the various external (Relex) services (Directorate-Generals, DGs) and the Commissioners in charge of them. At the moment the EC services are split into a variety of services which makes little sense: Policy is split from implementation with the effect that many units in AidCo, DG Development and DG Relex overlap; the desk officers responsible for certain countries are split artificially between DG Development and DG Relex. This reinforces the tendency to be geographical rather than policy oriented; Developing countries are split between the two DGs but all development policy units are situated in DG Development. Moreover, internal disagreements, different cultures and dogfights between the services add to the problems.

The direction of the implementing agency (EuropeAid/AidCo) consisted under the Prodi Commission of a Board with Commissioner Patten (DG Relex) as chairman and Commissioner Nielson (DG Development) as executive director. The other Relex Commissioners also had a place on the board. The logic behind the setup was that all DGs which had projects/programmes implemented through the agency should influence the decision-making. Unfortunately, severe disagreements between Mr. Patten and Mr. Nielson caused problems. Mr. Barroso did not want to avoid that and decided to get rid of the board and hand over sole responsibility to Mrs. Ferrero-Waldner. There is some logic in making the decision-making simpler, but unfortunately the consequence is that the Commissioner for Development, Mr. Michel will have no direct influence over evaluations or implementation in developing countries. The overall concern is, however, that the organisational setup in the European Commission is now more complex and shattered than ever.

There are several layers of procedures and management systems within the European Commission which also create serious problems for effective and timely delivery of the external assistance. The overall Financial Regulations of the EU budget which form the overall procedural framework for EC external assistance are based on a logic driven by internal EU developments. The general regulations are created with the purpose of spending resources within Europe and not in developing countries. The ‘translation’ of these Financial Regulations into guidelines and handbooks is also causing unnecessary problems for the people who have to use them. Very few people who use the implementing procedures in developing countries are involved in designing and revising these regulations.

The procedural framework which EC officials have to use does not allow strategic and effective implementation of external assistance when programmes target sensitive matters (for example governance issues or trade negotiations), processes (such as regional integration, civil service reform or capacity building) or aim at using windows of opportunities to foster strategic changes in a given country. In other words, the procedures hinder the EC in financing programmes which target the interface between security and development. One solution is to establish one set of financial regulations for external relations which accommodate the particularities of external assistance and external policies. That can be done while still respecting the general principles of the EU budget and the need for transparency and accountability.

Lastly, there is a problem with the way in which the three EU institutions interact in the area of external assistance: the European Parliament manifests its powers through the budget allocations and is not sufficiently involved in the strategic policy discussions. This creates a lack of ownership on the behalf of the European Parliament and has resulted in politically-driven reallocations of funds which reflect particular geographical interests rather than needs. As the European Parliament, the Council is split into several committees and working parties which often deal with particular issues but are there to reinforce overall focus and consistency.

All these technical implementation constraints need to be addressed if the EU is to effectively put action behind
words and become a responsible and effective partner for third countries.

Concluding remarks windows of opportunity

The European Commission thus faces two major challenges:

- The necessity to create synergies between the external policies and achieve a more effective and coherent mix of its external policies;
- An urgent need to strengthen the capacity of the European Commission to effectively deliver on the policy objectives decided by the European Member States and the European Parliament.

The current evolution of the EU external actions architecture creates a window of opportunity which must not be by-passed. 2005 is a year of change, and hopefully, all the external policies can come out strengthened.

In order to be successful in this endeavour, stakeholders need to:

- Be realistic about what the EC can deliver: The gap between delivery and policy rhetoric is not useful but works as a boomerang that will haunt the whole of EU external actions if it is not addressed;
- Acknowledge the constraints within which the EC operates: Various agendas of the political masters, cumbersome procedures and bureaucratic systems are limiting the quality, speed, results and impact of EC actions abroad;
- Match commitments and objectives with adequate means (human, financial);
- Be open about the time-lag between policy discussions in Europe (Brussels) and delivery on the ground;
- Ensure that development cooperation does not become isolated. The financial flows from the EU are big but not enough to actually change the economic and political situations in developing countries. These flows are important to many countries, but in the end, it will be other policy areas, including security, trade and internal policies, that matter to the long-term development of most developing countries.
- Recognise that development cooperation at the EU level will never be politically independent. Development cooperation is one among other foreign policies in the EU. Development cooperation has something to offer and little to be ashamed of.
- Ensure that EC/EU development community does not become defensive.
Constant dialogue with other foreign policies areas such as security and trade is needed.

If enough space is given, the European Commission can foster institutional mechanisms which effectively implement the policy mix, but it needs political backing and support in order to establish an organisational structure that will increase its capacity to convert the high-levelled policy objectives into timely and effective action on the ground.

Endnotes

1 This article builds on the work carried out by the EU programme in ECDPM.

2 EC development cooperation did have to pay some attention to the foreign policy interests of Member States, often manifested in the EDF Committee, but it was also possible to play on the differences between the EC and Member States. EC Delegates therefore had, and were perceived to have by the ACP, a good degree of flexibility in how they operated. EC aid thus came to be seen as largely apolitical in much the same way as assistance through the UN system.

3 See forthcoming ECDPM InBrief ›Sounding the Alarm. What future for NAOs and co-management in ACP-EU partnership‹ by Jonas Frederiksen, Oliver Hasse and Heather Baser, 2005.

4 See ECDPM InBrief no. 10, ›Better aid delivery or deconcentration of bureaucracy. A snapshot of the EC devolution process‹, 2004.
6. Poverty-oriented in the long term? The relation between development and security policy judged from a civil society view

Reinhard Hermle

The difficult relationship between development and security policy will be an integral part of my presentation. As various speakers have already mentioned, something like a grand coalition of interests seems to exist. Taking into account the complexity of the new world order and international relations, this approach is based on the insight that global problems cannot be solved by one of the main actors in the international policy area alone. They require an integration of the policy area’s different approaches. This includes security, external relations, development, environment policy, etc.

I absolutely agree with this point of view. From the perspective of civil society’s actors, it marks quite a step forward that the European Security Strategy (ESS) shares the same opinion. Furthermore, the ESS differs in a positive manner from US strategies, in particular concerning the assessment of its own power and the meaning of multilateralism. The central statement of the ESS is that development depends on security and that security requires development. Regarding this interdependence, there is a visible consensus at this conference.

Certainly, the integration of different policy areas represents good and important progress. There is a far-reaching common point of view that there must not be an alternative. But we have to take a close look at individual cases. Only after an analysis of these we will be able to decide which instruments can be taken from the security toolbox to reach our objectives.

Despite these shared principles, a lot of key questions have to be answered. Therefore, the Non-Governmental Development Organisations remain sceptical. I would like to give a view of our concerns in the following.

The different objectives of development and security policy

Again I would like to start with the different objectives of development and security policy. In my opinion, both areas are guided by distinct priorities. Development policy deals with the improvement of living conditions in poor countries and intends to contribute to the security of people living in developing countries by stabilising their political, social, economic and ecological environment. The security of the others constitutes the specific objective of development policy.

In contrast to this, the perspective of security policy refers in particular to our own security. I think this is the fundamental difference between both policy areas. The ESS is determined by threats which seem to be relevant to our own security—terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, epidemics, etc. Europe has to be protected against these threats or developments which are perceived as threats. The approach reflects the importance of our own interests. On the other hand, the situation in countries outside Europe is seen only in connection with its meaning for Europe’s security, not from a perspective of people’s needs in developing countries. Strategies resulting from this point of view serve our protection. I don’t say that this perspective is wrong, but in comparison to development policy approaches, it follows another priority.

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has become more complex. The threats deriving from this historic change appear more extensive and less calculable than before. The guiding principle of the East-West Conflict—a world order which was determined by a black and white pattern of good and bad—has been removed. The identification of the enemy was relatively easy, with military threats being followed by military responses. In this situation, development policy did not play an independent role. Rather, it depended on the good behaviour of Third World countries and was created
as a kind of reward. Today, the complex problems at global level require a different approach. In this respect, security and development policy are able to complement each other, but they can also get in conflict because of their distinct perspectives and interests.

Another difference between the two areas relates to the duration of measures. The objective of security policy focuses on short-term steps and rapid success, whereas development policy pursues long-term goals. The crises in the Balkans, especially in Kosovo, and in Afghanistan reveal that short-term military operations are not sufficient for the stabilisation of a country or region. Great significance must be attached to long-term assistance—in many cases, this contains military measures as well as developmental efforts.

The hierarchy of different policy areas

The second key issue being discussed intensively within the development community refers to the question of a balance between the different strategic approaches of development policy on the one hand and foreign and security policy on the other. Which policy area possesses the power to influence the other? In this context, the magic word of coherence is increasingly mentioned. We all know that establishing coherence at institutional level is a difficult task. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the policy of the European Union was to be guided by this imperative, and the development community demands the realisation of this principle from the governments of the Member States, too. But de facto coherence lacks implementation. Therefore, we are concerned about development policy possibly being harnessed for security matters. In this scenario, development policy would not play an independent role and could not contribute its own priorities to the policy agenda. Maybe development and humanitarian aid would form a growing part of political-military interventions with the task to support or even to legitimise these strategies. I admit that these fears are influenced by experiences made in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and on the whole this perception mainly reflects US procedures. In my point of view, so far, there has not been real cause for complaint in Germany or Europe relating to this point.

At the same time, it remains an open question which 25-30 especially fragile states currently being in the focus of development and security policy will be chosen to be a priority in the future. Will these decisions be influenced by a development agenda? Or do security aspects determine cooperation?

The financial resources of policy areas

A third key issue is the problem of financial resources. What amount of money is effectively available for which purposes? A lot of hopes grew up within the development community after 09/11/2001. There seemed to be a realistic prospect to increase financial resources for developmental matters. The political rhetoric paid more attention to the phenomenon of poverty. This insight did not result from a so-called linear relation between poverty and terrorism. I think this is a wrong assumption. But it is generally recognised that poverty supports the emergence of political extremism up to terrorism. Therefore, the fight against poverty was given a significant role in speeches of many politicians. More weight should be put on poverty issues to dry out the breeding ground for radicalism.

Yet the expected development dividend did not become reality. Although the donor countries committed themselves to increase financial resources for development at the Monterrey Conference in March 2002 and raised their budget for Official Development Assistance (ODA) in real terms, efforts must be considered marginal. The money available is not enough to realise the Millennium Development Goals. All experts agree on the opinion that at least a doubling of current ODA would be required to help to reach the postulate of halving extreme poverty and hunger by 2015. However, a substantial increase of financial resources does not become apparent.

The view on European expenditure for military purposes illustrates the relations. Currently, the EU countries are spending 160 billion euros a year for military purposes. Otherwise, development cooperation has a quarter of this amount at its disposal. There is an extreme disparity between these two areas—not only in Europe, but also world-wide. Altogether, Europe’s military power comprises two million soldiers. In contrast, how many experts are employed to handle conflicts, peace and development work, etc.? Yesterday, I read a newspaper article in Süddeutsche Zeitung (22/11/2004). It dealt with the debate on the establishment of twelve EU battle groups for military operations in crisis situations, especially in
Africa. The battle groups comprise approximately 18,000 soldiers. The headline was called »Europa rüstet auf« (Europe arms its military potential). The text reported the simultaneous establishment of civil capacities (13,000 persons) to cope with civil wars and natural disasters. This information was explained in ten lines, while the rest of the text dealt with the military aspects of the EU approach. Certainly, one cannot arrive at a concrete conclusion from this article concerning the evaluation of the European Security Strategy’s various dimensions. But it does illustrate public perception. In this context, the media play a significant role. Obviously, the figure of military intervention continues to exude a special fascination. Something happens, it provides impressive pictures, there exists a kind of drama. Often, this perception gives the suggestion of surgical operations with high prospects of success. The horror and cruelty of these operations tends to be suppressed. Compared to this, development cooperation appears to be a »boring« continuum, lacking spectacular moments. Especially positive developments happen in a peaceful and inconspicuous atmosphere and therefore do not attract the same attention.

This situation leads to the fact that it does not seem to be difficult to mobilise financial resources for military purposes, even if huge sums are involved, while expenditure on development priorities does not correspond to these allocations. I would like to clarify once again that the NGOs working in development policy criticize the decision to finance the African Peace Facility by resources stemming from the European Development Fund (EDF). This attitude does not mean a general objection to efforts to secure peace and stability in Africa, but it rejects the manner of resource allocation. I think it cannot be the right way to finance military activities by means of resources originally allocated to poverty reduction. We hope that this decision arose from the necessity of the moment and does not represent a guideline for the future. But since, in accordance with the EU Constitution, the prospective European Foreign Minister has the right to access EDF resources, doubts remain justifiable. At this point, it is important to note that the relationship between development and security policy should be guided by a divided responsibility. Each area has to allocate its own money for the solution of its tasks and priorities.

The role of military operations

Finally, let me point out two general problems. In my point of view, the intensity of the debate on interventions and the growing frequency of actions accustoms the public to military operations. In the end, this leads to the result that military actions again become a normal way of policy-making. This opinion mirrors disappointment, too. Perhaps we all had a deep hope that we had gone one more step forward concerning the condem-
nation of war. On the other hand, one has to accept that the world has not become as peaceful as we hoped after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of system confrontation. But war and military measures have to be considered with the highest possible caution and must really be backed by a UN mandate and the observance of current international law. The fact that there is an opposite trend evokes our concerns and vigilance.

We have to clarify another key question: is there a tendency to overestimate the effect of military interventions regarding conflict solution? The chaos in Iraq illustrates that a change of system by means of military intervention does not automatically lead to a peaceful political order. This points to the problem of overstretched one’s own capacities. Military operations are not able to create a peaceful environment on their own. The solution of conflicts depends on various strategies, taking into consideration political, diplomatic, economic and developmental approaches. The NGO view prefers conflict prevention and civil treatment of conflicts to military interventions. In my opinion, only one consequence results from this attempt: a reinforcement of development policy. This means widening direct help for Less Developed Countries as well as the establishment of a development supporting structural policy at global level.

Endnote

1 Translation from a German presentation by Tobias Hauschild, WEED.
2 For further information see Box 2.
Financing for development and security

In the second round of discussions, the future budget lines within the EU’s Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 stood at the heart of debates. Francoise Moreau emphasised that the European Commission seeks to establish a division into development-related budget lines and security-related ones. “Because we think that using development funds for objectives, policies and strategies which not necessarily benefit developing countries most is not the right way forward.” She underlined the importance of the right policy mix. Current challenges as problems with failing states or bad governance demand a better integration of development and security policy. Nonetheless, financial resources should be kept separated.

According to Ms. Moreau, the EU must concentrate on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. To do so, Europe has to increase its Official Development Assistance. “The EU has already made a big effort since we are going to reach more than the target which was agreed just before the Monterrey Conference in 2002 by the EU Member States. Their combined effort is going to reach approximately 0.45% of gross national income within the EU in 2006. So we are really moving towards the 0.7%-objective.” Concerning ODA, the future definition of criteria within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD has to be reviewed carefully. In order to reach the 0.7%-objective, some OECD countries intend to broaden the criteria. “These discussions have been very complex because recognizing that in some situations you first need to put security conditions in place before you can do development cooperation means that when the security situation is really an obstacle to reach development objectives, it has to be acknowledged that it is part of the development agenda. And this means it belongs to development assistance.” In this regard, Reinhard Hierml sees one of the main challenges for civil society actors in the critical observation of these debates. In no circumstances should military operations, for instance in Iraq, be eligible for Official Development Assistance.

Jonas Frederiksen added that in 2005 a set of important decisions will determine the future balance between development and security policy. This relates especially to the overhaul of the Joint Development Policy Statement by the Council and the Commission, but also to the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013. The definition of instruments has to be discussed intensively, and special attention has to be given to the Neighbourhood Instrument. Moreover, it has to be clarified which criteria guide the future allocation of money between countries and regions in the South.

Development policy within the EU institutions

Concerning the development perspective of the EU Draft Constitution, Francoise Moreau said that the European Commission agrees with the outcome of the negotiations within the European Convent. This point of view results from the fact that the legal and political standing of EU development policy has been strengthened. “The Draft Constitution clearly places development cooperation as one of the policy areas in the EU’s external action together with security, foreign and trade policy. It defines very well that there are different areas, that those have to be coherent and that all contribute to the same general objectives of peace, security, human rights, development, eradication of poverty, etc. But it also precisely defines the specific objective of development cooperation: poverty reduction in the world. This allows for consistency of policies, and it should safeguard the funding for development to those specific objectives.”

Referring to competencies within the Commission, one should keep in mind that despite its limited responsibility, the Development Commissioner is also responsible for development policy in general, that means for all developing coun-
tries. In contrast, Mr. Frederiksen underlined that Development Commissioner Louis Michel has been weakened within the Barroso Commission because he lost control over the implementation of development programmes within the EU’s implementation agency EuropeAid.

**Complementarity between Brussels and the Member States**

In his point of view, one of the biggest challenges in European development policy persists in sufficient coordination between Brussels and the Member States’ programmes. He welcomed the initiative of the European Council to set up a working group in order to push coordination at European level. In the context of complementarity, the EU Development Policy Statement of 2000 played a positive role by focusing Brussels’ activities on six focal areas. “The limitation on six activities in which the EU provides comparative advantages has been an invitation to the Member States. But Member States have missed to coordinate their development policies. Within Europe, a lot of resources are still wasted because of this lack of cooperation,” Jonas Frederiksen said. Francoise Moreau endorsed this statement by adding that all European donors are committed to the internationally agreed development agenda. This includes the Millennium Development Goals and the major UN conferences and their programmes, which were adopted during the 1990ies. She postulated concrete steps forward. The common analysis of countries’ needs could be a starting point, but more needs to be done. “Why are we not capable of having the same strategy used by all countries? We have to agree on what the EU’s global strategy should be. Then we have to decide on a division of labour depending on which Member State is present or not in that country. What are its experiences concerning cooperation? What are its strengths, weaknesses, etc.?“

**The future role of civil society actors**

Concerning the relationship between security and development policy, Reinhard Hermle supported closer cooperation between both policy areas. But the different objectives of these areas have to be recognised, and it remains crucial to maintain an independent and autonomous development policy. Civil society actors must attend this cooperation carefully. “Development policy has to participate in these discussions in a proactive manner. I’m very optimistic regarding this challenge. Development policy has always been able to adapt itself to changing environments. In the beginning, development policy comprised projects and programmes. Today, we talk about global structures, which means that development policy interferes in trade, agriculture issues etc. And I’m convinced that development policy will do the same within the complex and difficult relationship between development and security policy.” The German efforts in Afghanistan had been a successful example of cooperation between the two areas, Mr. Hermle said. Both areas have acted together, but their responsibilities have been separated. This approach differs from the US attempt of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, in which the two areas exist under one umbrella. The German government’s action plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding” points in the right direction, since it establishes a guideline for the different national actors (Defense, Foreign and Development Ministry). Now the instruments of this approach have to be further implemented. In this context, civil society actors will play an important role.

**Endnotes**

1 The Development Commissioner is in charge of cooperation with the ACP countries, whereas cooperation with Asia and Latin America is managed by the Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood.
The background

The question of political dialogue and political conditionality has risen throughout the debate on the failure of development policies in Third World countries.

This was especially true regarding the Least Developed Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. In that part of the world, poverty has risen dramatically and the human development indicators are also negative. In terms of perspective, even the World Bank admits that a 7% growth per year would be necessary for these Least Developed Countries in order to reverse the poverty trend and meet the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals (World Bank 2000): the current rate of African growth is about 4% per year (Global Coalition for Africa 2004: 16). And if you link poverty to conflict (as a root cause), then it would last about a century for those countries imprisoned in these vicious circles to emerge out of it and reduce poverty.

One of the doctrinal answers to the failure of development policies was «good governance». For instance, 300 billion dollars has been spent on Sub-Saharan Africa for a relatively poor performance in terms of human and economic progress. This part of the world accounts for less than 1% of global GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and 2% of global trade (Nkundabagenzi/Pailhe/Peclow 2002). In the aftermath of the Cold War and in the context of «aid fatigue» towards developing countries, a new paradigm emerged considering that economic development was not sufficient in itself (regardless of the political regime) in order to bring about social and political progress. In other words, the collapse of the Soviet regime proved that democracy was in fact the engine for economic and social progress.

This new axiom was first elaborated inside the Bretton Woods institutions and then spread to the whole donor community. But as political issues are delicate, the reform concerned less the nature of the regimes than its format: the concept of good governance was born. It is defined by four criteria: economic efficiency, transparency (in the management of public affairs), accountability and the rule of law. Regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, taking on this new trend, French President François Mitterrand appealed to African leaders at La Baule Summit in June 1990, urging them to adopt multiparty political systems and conditioning his country’s aid to democratic reforms.

Limits of political conditionality

The “normativity” of good governance

The 1990’s started off in euphoria for the democratic movements in the Third World. According to some witnesses, they were comparable to the independence period of the late 1960’s. Regime changes were then the result of a combination of street and grass-root pressure and the international community’s insistence on better government. The UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) has observed that if in 1980, 54 countries (46% of world population at that time) were considered democratic; in 1999, 121 nations out of 147 (68% of world
population) had adopted the democratic system of government (UNDP 2002: 57).

But «good governance» will be criticized for several reasons. First of all, there was a perception that some semantic shift had been made without the consent of the South, with the notion of good governance transforming into a «democratic injunction». This democratic injunction then gave way to political conditionality, which is aimed at the nature of the regimes and not their format.

From this comes the most essential critic, which is that the «democratic model» proposed is in fact inadequate for non-westernized societies that have not undergone a social and cultural modernization that could equip them for democracy. In other words, how can you apply democratic values and attitudes to societies that basically do not have the same historical and cultural background as Western countries?

One simple example from Africa can illustrate what is at stake. When the Rwandan government was adopting its first democratic constitution in 1961, there was a problem of translation for the concept of «political opposition». In traditional Rwanda, an opponent is the enemy of the whole society; today it would be a «terrorist»! If political dissent is considered the ultimate social crime, how do you then define the rights of the opposition, which is a key actor in a democracy? Does this mean that there were no checks and balances in traditional Rwanda? Of course not, but the political architecture was different (with no political opposition) and yet permitted to control the action of the King. None of these traditional recipes were integrated later on, and so the country fell short of its potentialities in terms of political modernization with the consequences we all remember in 1994.

**The security issue**

By the mid-1990’s, one had to acknowledge that instability and conflict had risen and were widespread across the African continent, particularly where democratic reforms were taking place. Out of 22 democratic processes, 17 situations saw the incumbent dictator or regime being comforted and in the other circumstances, there were instability or war. When one looks at the figures regarding the nature and the scope of the major armed conflicts in the world in the last 15 years, it appears that the African and Asian continents have been the most affected by them. Both continents amount to 70% of all the most important wars fought on the planet since the end of the Cold War (SIPRI 2000). Sub-Saharan Africa represents half of the refugee population in the world. It is also where more than half the 300,000 child soldiers fought in several wars in West Africa, Central Africa or the Horn of Africa. This led the international community to integrate the security factor in its paradigm regarding development and democracy. It could now be read as: «without security and democracy, there can be no development» (Nkundabagenzi/Santopinto 2003; Akindes 2002; Mbembe 1998; United Nations Secretariat 1998).

The link between «democracy and conflict» in fragile states has become a major focus of studies in the anthropology of modern wars. Some empirical results tend to demonstrate what the promoters of good governance have always defended (Nkundabagenzi 2001), which is that the absence of democratic mechanisms of social regulation pushes the frustrated social groups into violence in order to promote or defend what they perceive as their vital interests (Fukuyama 1992). In that sense, democracy is only one of several means to bring about social change, and thus when the regime is of a rigid nature, the democratic process itself becomes destabilizing.

**Political dialogue in Cotonou**

Preoccupation with good governance and conflict prevention was translated in the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. The first chapter of this agreement refers directly to the outcome of the negotiation that had taken place between the ACP countries and the Commission. The two limitations regarding political conditionality mentioned above were met through a process, the political dialogue, and a framework, Article 11, which deals with conflict prevention.
Political dialogue between the EC and its ACP partners could be seen as a means to adapt the rigidity of the conditionality elements to the complexity of the reality of each society. This is why political dialogue encompasses not only the ordinary political actors but has been extended to Non-State Actors as well. The dialogue is political in the sense that it deals not only with the policies of development but also the traditional diplomatic issues, lifting a twenty-year taboo. Therefore, the normativity of the conditionalities can be discussed and challenged before being put in practice.

One has to keep in mind that political dialogue does not only take place during high level ministerial conferences but starts at grass-roots and national level between the EU representatives (delegation and Member State embassies) and ACP actors (whether State or civil society). Empirical observations have revealed that when it comes to the political dimension of Cotonou, two remarks can be made: there is a lack of coherence between EU actors on these issues (between first and second pillar, for instance), and there seems to be a lack of civil society involvement in political and security issues.

At the highest level, it has to be acknowledged that interesting debates have been engaged in by both actors regarding cultural and sociological dimensions of their respective societies that have an impact on their political cooperation. Subjects such as the repatriation of African cultural goods or the rights of homosexuals are being debated (Euro-African Summit 2000). This could seem trivial, but in the long-term perspective of better understanding and accompanying the anthropological mutations in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, these exchanges could be of immense importance.

**Conflict prevention**

Political dialogue is only one aspect of the political dimension of the Cotonou agreement. In order to achieve «structural stability» in war-torn societies or even in fragile states, peace is a precondition for development cooperation. But political, economic and financial instruments oriented towards such an objective can also use development cooperation in order to sustain and stabilize these vulnerable societies. Article 11 of Cotonou presents the framework of such cooperation (Nkundabagenzi/Santopinto 2003).

Article 11 covers all the stages of conflict management from the early warning to its resolution. At each moment, political dialogue is maintained between the EU and the ACP counterpart. The beneficiary of the EU’s Aid could be institutional actors (such as the State or even regional and sub-regional bodies) as well as Non-State Actors involved in the mediation or the resolution of conflicts. Here also, empirical findings show that civil society has not been much involved in the determination of the national priorities regarding security through the consultation mechanism provided by the Cotonou Agreement.

When it comes to conflict prevention, one of the most delicate issues is the question of sanctions. Articles 96 and 97 of Cotonou are normally linked to the debate about democratization, rule of law, human rights or good governance. I chose to raise this question here, with the question of conflict prevention, because with the definition of structural stability it appears very clearly that sanctions are part of the preventive diplomacy arsenal of the EU in order to prevent social and political tensions that could, in the end, lead to violent conflicts.

During the last few years, sanctions have been one major source of dissent between the two partners. They appear as a means to impose a «cultural model» on ACP countries. They have also been considered inappropriate or even anachronistic when considering the time frame they impose on the resolution of conflicts. In brief, they appear as being opposed to the principles of dialogue itself and «ownership» by ACP countries of their own destiny.

**The future**

Regarding the future of political dialogue, we would like to mention three recent evolutions that raise questions. On the specific aspect of the essential elements composing the conditionality framework, the EU insists on adding the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction next to human rights, democracy and rule of law. A strong opposition in the European civil society, amongst the development actors and from the ACP partners is emerging. This evolution can be directly linked to the adoption by the Council of Ministers of the European Security Strategy, written by Javier Solana. In the Security Strategy, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and failing states are seen as major threats to Europe and therefore, diplomatic, commercial and even development ties have to reorient in order to meet these challenges. Not only does the method once again seem
to contradict the idea of «ownership» in the Cotonou perspective but one can also wonder whether these threats reflect the needs in terms of the aid beneficiary’s security.

Another motive of concern is the enlargement of the EU to countries with little if no development cooperation history. The average of financial means invested in development of the 10 new countries is about 10 times less than the 15 others. As EDF envelope depends on Member States’ contributions and thus, on their political will, could the renegotiation of Cotonou lead to a diminishing of the global envelope if not a reinforcement and a reorientation of the objectives of the political dialogue?

One last issue is the adoption of the new framework between the first and second pillar that has created the office of European Foreign Minister. Its aim is to link EU external action in a coherent manner, but will this end up reinforcing the intergovernmental pillar and its specific objectives in terms of international relations and diplomacy? If this is the case, what effect would it have on the definition of the political conditionalities and political dialogue itself?
Civilian Perspective or Security Strategy?

9. Financing security objectives from national and European development budgets—a critical analysis

Olive Towey

Introduction

Today, I am going to speak about the topic of financing security policy objectives from national and European development budgets. It already seems a long time ago, but for the first half of 2004 Ireland held the EU Presidency. Those six months were significant from many perspectives, not least development cooperation. On 1st May, Ireland presided over the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 Member States—an expansion of the Union, which brings to us all remarkable opportunities and challenges in terms of working together to strengthen the role of the EU in overseas development. Those six months also saw the final agreement of the new European Constitutional Treaty—a treaty which sets a legal basis for development and speaks of a development policy for all developing countries. In the January Orientation Debate on Development Cooperation, there was agreement to adopt a needs-based approach to decisions on where EU aid should go. And at the May GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations Council), the EU stepped up to assume a ›leadership‹ role in relation to the 2005 MDG Review. This period also saw questions raised over the ODA DAC criteria—a critical debate which continued through the Dutch EU Presidency and which requires very deliberate and careful monitoring.

For our part as NGDOs, the theme of our Dochas Presidency Project—Human Security—became all too appropriate following the Madrid bombings in March. It was also timely and formative given the articulation of the first ESS (European Security Strategy). Both events brought the nexus between security and development into very sharp focus in such different ways.

Finally, in the context of the European Parliamentary elections, this period saw the European NGO network EUROSTEP launch its ›Vision of a Respon-
sible Europe in the World‹, a framework which sets out the very unique and particular role which the EU can and should play on the world stage with regard to overseas development, and a framework within which we set our agenda priorities in terms of EU development policy (EUROSTEP 2004).

It is an opportune time to have a conference specifically dedicated to the future relationship between development and security policy, and I am very grateful to have been invited.

What lies beneath …

In looking at my own topic, Financing security policy objectives from national and European development budgets, a number of questions immediately spring to my mind:

- Is there a risk that money intended for development objectives could be used for security objectives?
- Is there a risk that the Union’s pursuit of its security objectives will be at a cost to the advancement of its development objectives?
- Is there a danger that the scale and independence of its development policy will be undermined by the EU’s ambition in implementation of the ESS?
- Will there be a clear, principled, transparent definition of money which is for development cooperation and money which is for security purposes?

Furthermore, if we are looking at whether and how security policy objectives could be financed from national or European development budgets, it is necessary to probe the degree to which there is and, more importantly, will in future be, clarity and transparency in relation to what money will be spent for what purposes and based on what principles. The greater the clarity and transparency, the easier it is to address the question of
what funds are being used for what purposes.

An independent development policy arena?

To what extent is development cooperation an independent policy arena? To answer this question, we need to look at the rhetoric but also the reality. What is agreed at Treaty level? What is manifest at policy level? What is happening institutionally—on the ground in Brussels? Is there coherence and consistency between the words and deeds?

Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries (Art III-316 Constitutional Treaty). Set out in the Treaty is a clear articulation of the overarching objective of development cooperation and a responsibility that the Union will refer to and take account of this objective in those other policies it implements in these regions of the world. Its role and its responsibility is clear, and the legal basis for the Union’s priority-setting in this area rests upon a single primary objective. Moving from the treaty to ‘sub-treaty’ level, these principles must be manifest at policy level, and indeed the Development Policy Statement agreed by the Commission and the Council in 2000 provides clear articulation of a policy focussed on poverty reduction (and) related to all developing countries.

At policy level, some of the key requirements of an effective policy, which include but go beyond what is stated above, comprise:

- **clear objective**: poverty eradication;
- **no geographic discrimination** i.e. development policy should apply to all OECD DAC countries;
- **meaningful criteria**: the DAC criteria must be meaningful;
- **thematic definition** of policies;
- **framework**: the policy and its implementation must be set in the context of international commitments.

When we move from the words, the principles and the objectives set out in treaties and policies to the reality of what is happening on the ground, one of the most crucial debates is the one happening at present, which seeks to agree the future financial structures which will apply to EU expenditure in the term 2007-2013. This debate is the Financial Perspectives. Normally, the Financial Perspectives is the EU’s multi-annual budgetary spending review. This time it is much more than that. This time, within these negotiations, there is a major overhaul of the EU budget, representing a significant reform of the financial and legal structure of the EU’s external policies, accompanied by a completely new set of regulations. A rough timeline is set out below.

**Figure 9.1: Timeline for reform of the EU’s financial and legal structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feb 04</th>
<th>Jul 04</th>
<th>Sep 04</th>
<th>Dec 04</th>
<th>Jun 05</th>
<th>Sep 05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy Based</td>
<td>Hybrid-Thematic &amp; Geographic</td>
<td>Deadline for Agreement on Framework</td>
<td>Deadline for Agreement on Finance</td>
<td>National Referenda on New Constitution across ca. 10 MSs</td>
<td>DAC criteria OECD agenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At present, there are approximately 40 separate instruments under which the EU’s external relations financing is governed. This is a huge and cumbersome framework, and it has been acknowledged for some time that some rationalisation is needed. In negotiating the new Financial Perspectives for the coming period 2007-2013, the terms of this rationalisation will be argued out and in the end negotiated.

As it stands, the Commission has put a set of proposals on the table which sees the existing 40 separate instruments consolidated into six separate regulations: three so-called »Geographic« and three so-called »Thematic« (see Figure 9.2).

Two of these six exist at present governing Humanitarian Aid and Macro Economic Assistance, while the proposed new regulations are:

- Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument (DCECI),
- European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument,
- Pre-Accession Instrument,
- Stability Instrument.

The following comments relate for the most part to the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument. I will restrict myself to just a few brief comments in relation to the other two most significant instruments from a development cooperation perspective (New Neighbourhood and Stability) and recommend both Eurostep (www.eurostep.org) and the CONCORD Financial Perspectives Task Force for further information.

**Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument: the end of an EU development policy**

This proposed regulation has no explicit focus on development cooperation as a policy area in its own right. It has global coverage, including OECD countries, and therefore has no specific relevance or application towards developing countries. The new regulation mixes a variety of policy objectives, and therefore can, and will, no longer guarantee a place for development policy.

If the European Development Fund for the EU’s cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries was budgetised, the current proposal would provide no possibilities to protect aid to these countries. The regulation needs to be split between separate regulations with a Development Cooperation regulation for cooperation with all developing countries, and one on Economic Cooperation for cooperation with other third countries.

In its current form, the permeability of the current proposed regulation provides a blank cheque that allows the Commission to use the valuable resources intended for poverty eradication for any area or purpose it finds relevant at any one time.

The regulations will infringe on the powers of the European Parliament

The new regulations will undermine the democratic nature of the EU institutions and will infringe on the powers of the European Parliament. It is unprecedented that the Financial Perspectives are accompanied by a completely new set of regulations. While the Financial Perspectives are agreed between Member States, the Parliament is included in the adoption of the regulations via co-decision procedures. Connecting these two dif-
different procedures causes problems both procedurally and substantively.

While the Financial Perspectives are principally an instrument to ensure a long-term financing agreement between the Member States, the European Parliament is one leg of the budget authority. The new regulations intend to curb the powers of the European Parliament through the budget, by creating an overall heading, which no longer allows Parliament to define its own priorities. If these new regulations are adopted the European Parliament will give up its powers to set priorities in EU external relations through the budget.

While the Commission is the executive body of the EU institutions, this proposal intends to give it additional powers, which reach much further than implementation of policy priorities set by the budgetary authority (the European Council and European Parliament). The regulations materially reduce the power of the European Parliament, with the real powers for allocating resources and implementation being transferred to the European Commission.

European opinion polls continue to show ongoing support for poverty eradication in developing countries. The idea that these resources, generously contributed by European tax-payers, will be utilised without accountability and without definition of their purpose is unacceptable. The European Parliament should, in the view of Eurostep and its members, reject the regulations as these will harm both the project of integration in the European Union and the cause for global eradication of poverty.

The regulations contravene the EU Constitutional Treaty and undermine its credibility

The Constitutional Treaty clearly identifies the components of the EU’s external relations. Development cooperation is an autonomous policy area, identified under a separate legal heading, defined with its own overarching objective—the eradication of poverty, and instruments. It is clearly defined as a policy area applicable to all developing countries, in line with the OECD-DAC definitions of Official Development Aid. The provisions in the Constitutional Treaty ensure that EU resources for development cooperation will be used effectively and in line with internationally agreed standards for cooperation.

However, the proposed new regulations would no longer provide an instrument with a specific provision for development cooperation. It is therefore of crucial importance that such an instrument be established for Development Cooperation that is exclusively based on Article 179 of the TEC Treaty, and Articles III 316-318 of the Constitutional Treaty. This would be consistent with instruments for other policy areas, each of which correspond to a distinct policy domain of the Union’s external action (as reflected in separate sections in the Constitutional Treaty—e.g. the section on humanitarian aid—Art. III-321 of the Constitution). The Constitutional Treaty treats economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries as a separate section from development cooperation (articles III-319/320), and states very clearly that this provision is for “third countries other than developing countries“ (Art. III-319). Merging these two clearly separated instruments, each with their own beneficiaries and specific objectives, will cause confusion as to the objectives pursued and the allocation of budgets.

Therefore the two policy areas considered by this instrument proposed by the Commission (economic cooperation with third countries on the one hand, and development cooperation on the other hand) must be clearly distinguished from each other. This should be done by creating separate instruments for the two policy areas—coupled to separate financing mechanisms and separate budget lines—for Development Cooperation on the one hand, and Economic Cooperation on the other.

The new regulations jeopardise efforts to enhance the European contribution to the Millennium Development Goals

The EU is firmly committed to the Millennium Development Goals—and in May 2004 the GAERC adopted strong conclusions to that effect. The Millennium Development Goals have the principal aim of eradicating poverty. The EU can only be a credible contributor to the MDGs if the EU acknowledges the need to maintain a specific policy focused on these aims, as agreed in the EU Treaties and the Constitutional Treaty.

In this regard it should be noted that the OECD peer review noted the confusion between EU policies and called on the EU to «Clarify the structural responsibilities within the «Relax family» for the allocation of resources to all developing countries» (OECD/DAC 2002). As
the discussion on the institutional structure allocated to development within the European Commission is currently taking place, this attempt to mix the cooperation frameworks offered to developing and industrialized countries is only increasing the confusion on the objective and scope of EU development policy.

Europe needs strong partnerships with its allies in the developing countries. The Cotonou Agreement, covering the EU’s cooperation with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific regions has sought to base itself and expand upon this partnership. The EU must acknowledge the strategic importance of such meaningful partnerships, which can only be based on a credible strategy towards the MDGs. Any moves that weaken the EU’s partnership in this respect will ultimately create critical problems for Europe’s engagement with developing countries around the world. A strong and independent development policy needs to be in place to make sure that Europe’s engagement with the developing countries remains constructive, is based on partnerships and is forward-looking.

New Neighbourhood Instrument

First and foremost, it should be noted that the territory marked as ‘new neighbourhood’ includes both MEDA and TACIS programmes, covering 10 Mediterranean partners plus Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Twelve of the 17 countries (70%) under the New Neighbourhood Instrument are ‘developing countries’. So, clearly, this instrument relates in a significant way to developing countries.

However, the aim of this instrument is not development cooperation but a wide variety of objectives spanning the promotion of market economy, trade and security. Where there is mention of poverty, it is in terms of poverty reduction rather than poverty eradication, and the language relating to the participation of ‘civil society’ is very weak. And while the problem of HIV/AIDS in many of the countries across this region has been widely recognised and acknowledged, there is actually no mention or special consideration of this within the instrument or its priority objectives.

Stability Instrument

The objective of the Stability Instrument is to deliver an effective, immediate, integrated response to crises and instability through one financing instrument. «This article establishes a direct link between the delivery of assistance in crisis and the pursuit of the Community’s development, economic cooperation and human rights policies. With the current exception of some elements of peace-support operations, most assistance delivered will qualify as DAC eligible.» (European Commission 2004d)

There are a couple of points of concern in relation to this.

- Firstly, this is a regulation of the Council alone, while DAC expenditure relates to development cooperation—a community competence. There is therefore some internal inconsistency in the statement above.

- Secondly, this regulation covers a wide variety of policies (from emergency and long-term measures, to civil or military operations, from the JHA (Justice and Home Affairs) to the development agenda), and a wide variety of objectives—some DAC’able others not.

- The risk inherent in this diverse coverage and potential applicability is overlap and blurring of lines between it and the DCECI.

Signals and conclusions

Given this brief overview of some of the more worrying aspects of a number of the new instruments, there are a few important points, which should be reiterated before concluding:

- In spite of the fact that poverty eradication is at the very heart of EU development policy and in spite of its clear principled legal basis in the Constitutional Treaty, the new Commission proposals contain no commitment to aid being focused on tackling poverty.

- The proposals blur the definition of ODA to include foreign policy expenditure in all regions, from US to India.

- Development policy is integrated into these regulations without a specific definition in any of them.

European citizens want to see Europe responding to its global responsibility through a strengthening of itself and an
ability to speak with one voice, committed to multilateralism and the eradication of poverty.

More than two thirds of Europeans believe that the Union can contribute to solving problems linked with poverty (Eurobarometer 2003).

If we are to be a strong legitimate player on the world stage in terms of development cooperation, it is crucial to maintain a strong independent development policy. Europe must improve and increase its investment in both security and development, not finance one at the expense of the other.
Financing of development and security needs

At the start of discussions Olive Towey underlined that financing mechanisms for development objectives need to be kept separate from those budget lines available for the financing of security purposes. She continued that «... there has to be a link between the purpose and the source. If I were taking money for development purposes, then it would need to come very clearly from a part of development expenditure. If I were taking money for security purposes or any other purpose on external relations, then it would have to be related to the part of money that is for the purposes of external relations. Development money is for development purposes, and security money is for security purposes. What we need in the framework is that clarity and transparency.» It is in that context that Olive Towey sees that the lines are getting blurred. Later on she added that a more proactive role of civil society actors in the field of development policy can only be achieved if they engage intensively in the upcoming debates on the Financial Perspectives 2007 to 2013. This is where the financing of the different policy areas will be determined for the coming years.

European engagement in Africa

In her presentation Claire Mandouze outlined European and US-American efforts to bring peace to the Darfur region in Sudan. In her view, the EU and US are increasingly competing for stabilisation and peace-building efforts in Africa. But not all stakeholders are supporting efforts by the African Union to find Africa’s own solutions to its conflicts. France has been opposed to the African Peace Facility and EU support for the African Union associated with this initiative due to the former colonial power’s fear of decreasing political influence in West Africa. Overall, strengthened EU engagement in Africa has contributed to a renewed US interest in Africa. EU support for the African Peace Facility has contributed to growing US interests to strengthen its own peacekeeping efforts in Africa. However, these efforts would have constituted an independent US initiative rather than a contribution to EU-led activities. In the course of discussions, the US government could be convinced to accept the EU taking precedence in peacekeeping in Africa. »There is obviously an increased interest to develop a new European Security Policy on Africa. The challenge is there, and the importance is to maintain and to support the credibility and the capacity of the African Union (AU) to be able to deal with it. Darfur is the first test, and everybody is watching the African Union: will they fail or not?« A failure of the African Union’s peace-building efforts could be a rather realistic assumption, taking the complexity of the challenge into account.

The future of the African Union

According to Claire Mandouze, the integration of African civil society in shaping the African Union’s security policy
the fostering of regional integration. But security matters are at the core of the organisation. The new approach constitutes a strong commitment to security in Africa, taking into consideration military operations of the AU in member states to promote peace and stability. Furthermore, the funding act entails inter alia declarations for the protection of human rights.

One of the main incentives for the creation of a stronger African security organisation was the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. It revealed the need for Africa to develop its own capacities to deal with its own conflicts. Independent African solutions in conflict situations are potentially better and more sustainable than efforts from outside. One of the main lessons of the Rwandan case was that there may not be a time gap between the start of a conflict and intervention from outside. The time-consuming process of forming a consensus in the international arena for an intervention of the United Nations showed the need for Africa to create its own peacekeeping forces.

The funding of the AU led to a more intensive institutional level of governance in the continental field. The organisation aims at meeting the requirements by creating a series of institutions as the African Commission (which mirrors the European Commission and is designed to act as an supranational coordinator and motor of change), the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council of Ministers, the Peace and Security Council, the African Parliament, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council and the Court of Justice. The European Union shall provide a model for African integration. The process of creating such a range of institutions illustrates an important change in African politics.

At first the AU concentrated its attention especially on the creation of an African continental architecture for peace and security, following the guideline that development is based on a peaceful environment. Within this framework, the Peace and Security Council, established in 2004, represents the main actor. The institution follows the principles of the United Nations Security Council and is allowed to permit interventions of the African Union. The underlying principle of this process is non-indifference. Obviously, there is a change concerning the perception of security threats since the former leading African institution OAU emphasized the principle of non-interference which set a high value on the sovereignty of independent states meaning that violations of human rights inside an African country were not seen as a problem to be dealt with at continental level. Regarding the Protocol for Peace and Security, the AU is now able to intervene in cases of crimes against a country’s own population, regional conflicts, etc. Thus, while acknowledging in general the principle of sovereignty of member states, these provisions represent an important step forward concerning conflict prevention and resolution in Africa.

In order to be able to fulfil the high expectations, the AU is now building its own capacities to engage in conflict situations. The member states are encouraged to provide military forces to accomplish these missions which include traditional peacekeeping forces with an observer mandate as well as peace enforcement operations. The AU mission in Darfur/Sudan, started in December 2004, is the first test for the African efforts in the area of peacekeeping.

Despite the promising start of the AU, many observers remain sceptical concerning the AU’s capacity to act. From their point of view it is questionable whether the AU Peace and Security Council can ensure the political will and unity to accomplish its mandate. The key question is whether the African states are able to speak with one voice? However, keeping in mind that the AU has existed for only two years, the African states have launched the most ambitious project of integration on the continent ever. Supporters of the AU’s emergence refer to the fact that building effective governance at continental level is a long-term process and that even the European Union took 50 years to arrive at its current stage of integration. In addition, in comparison to European unification, the African states take a different perspective since the initial point of the AU’s formation stems from a political, not an economic approach. Finally, the new quality of the African Union can be seen as an expression of growing African self-confidence.

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objectives in particular provides for a positive relationship with the institution in the future. There is a closer dialogue between the African Union and African civil society networks on the means of closer participation. The organisation’s increased credibility needs to be further strengthened and expanded. In this respect its imperative is that integration in various regions be prioritised in order to address the complexity of African problems. Subsidiarity applied to African security needs holds the promise of success to which Europe could actively contribute by means of capacity building.

In the discussion, the generally positive outlook was challenged by a rather sceptical view on the development path of African integration. The experience of the past forty years clearly showed that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has not lived up to expectation. Now it remains to be seen whether such an ambitious programme will prove successful. The challenge remains to integrate the different and changing political interests and perspectives of fifty African countries. Lessons from the European integration give vivid testimony to the challenges of closer economic and political integration of a much lesser number of countries with their varying premises.

In her reply, Claire Mandouze explained the reasons for what constitutes her optimistic view on the future of African regional integration. On the one hand, African states themselves have recognized the fact that the Organisation of African Union has not been able to contribute substantially to peace, security and sustainable development in the continent as a whole. On the other hand, unlike the former OAU, the African Union is not a secretariat for post-colonial development. The AU moved towards continental integration through the availability of an enlarged toolbox for political intervention at regional level. The key to strengthening the ability to act at supranational level is the role played by South Africa and the Arab countries in Northern Africa. In addition, tasks and responsibilities of the AU have been significantly enlarged as compared to its predecessor: This includes not only the traditional fields of development and trade but comprises peace and security considerations, good governance, social issues, migration, etc. The redefinition of African integration leads to a new relation between the EU and Africa. Both actors are encouraged to develop a vision of the future role of the African Union and especially the African Commission. Concerning this process, the African Union’s strategic programme for sustainable development, passed in 2003 by the different actors of the organisation, constitutes an important element.

The need for financial support

According to Claire Mandouze, the support of the African governments for the implementation of this programme plays a decisive role, but also the EU has to allocate new financial resources in order to foster African integration. The financial assistance of the African Union’s activities in the Darfur conflict through money stemming from the European Development Fund brings the problem to light: The EU spends too little money on AU activities. «In fact, there is no money allocated for the African Union within in our cooperation agreement. This is the first challenge that we have to face. All the money has been given to national or regional organisations. One of the big tasks now—and I hope that this is taken by Commissioner Louis Michel—is that we need supplementing money to support the AU in a long-term development perspective.» Therefore, the architecture of European cooperation with Africa has to be renewed. By giving different emphasis to Northern Africa on the one hand and Sub-Saharan Africa on the other, the creation of an Instrument for the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy could implicate a serious problem for the African Union’s efforts. Countries in Northern Africa play a prominent role as buffer states in the EU’s migration and security policy, but the view on the Arabic states has to take into account the processes in other parts of Africa, too. Finally, the future of Northern Africa as well as the way Sub-Saharan Africa goes depends on the development of the continent as a whole.

In his final statement, Félix Nkunda-bagenzi pointed to the fact that Africa is the world region most affected by military conflicts. »The media focuses on certain parts of the world. We have the African situation tending to disappear from the attention of the international community. This means the donor community. It is extremely important to have dynamics in processes like the development of the AU or maybe even examples like Artemis or Darfur where you can see that cooperation between Europe and Africa can keep African issues at the highest level of the international agenda. If those types of dynamics do not exist we will reface the risk of having the in-
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International agenda only being mobilized by one or two specific issues. That will be determined from Washington and not from the UN or whatever.

Endnotes

1 Presentation not included in documentation.

2 See Box 1 and 2.

4 Within the framework of the peace mission Artemis, the European Union deployed a stability troop to the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003.

Box 2: The African Peace Facility

The African Peace Facility (APF) was setup following a request of the African Union (AU) Heads of State and Government at their Maputo Summit in July 2003. Thus the proposal to create a support mechanism for African peacekeepers in conflict situations was an African initiative. The EU decided to establish the APF in late 2003. The instrument became operational in April 2004 to finance African-led peace support operations, ranging from traditional peacekeeping forces with an observer mandate to peace enforcement operations. The APF has to be seen in the context of the G8/African Union Africa Action Plan to Enhance Capacity for Peace Support Operations, which was established at the G8 meeting in Kananaskis (Canada) in June 2002. The plan allows for strengthening and supporting the African capacities, so that African countries will be able to engage more effectively in missions of conflict prevention and resolution by 2010.

EU support to AU peacekeeping missions marks a change between the two regional organisations. Traditionally, economic cooperation constituted the core of European-African relations. The situation changed during the 1990ies, when good governance and the political dimension of cooperation gained increasing attention, for instance within the Cotonou Agreement, which emphasises the importance of conflict prevention. The APF has to be seen as the preliminary culmination of this development.

The European Union is supporting the African efforts with 250 million euros. Up to now (June 2005), approximately 100 million euros has been spent to assist AU missions in Sudan (92 million euros; peace support mission AMIS) and the Central African Republic (3.5 million euros, CEMAC peace-building operation). Furthermore, the first program of the AU Peace and Security Directorate’s institutional capacity-building has been launched. Further initiatives, i.e. in Somalia (a peace support operation for enhancing the security situation) and Rwanda/Democratic Republic of Congo (AU participation in the Joint Verification Mechanism and its contribution to the disarmament and neutralization of armed groups in Eastern DRC), are envisaged. Possible fields of EU support and the implementation of supported missions are being debated within the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) of the African Union Commission and the European Commission.

At the centre of debates has been the financing of the 250 million euros instrument, since the money comes from the European Development Fund (EDF). 126.4 million euros has been mobilised by a reduction of country allocations (1.5%), while the remainder money stems from as yet not scheduled resources of the EDF. Civil society’s actors criticise the transfer of resources from EDF, arguing that spending EDF’s money on peacekeeping could imply a decrease of money allocated to poverty-orientated long-term development cooperation.

Finally, the success of the APF depends on its coherence with EU aid policy. In this regard, a close interaction between the two elements could strengthen the development efforts. «Certainly the focus on African Union capacity building enshrined within the facility does not contradict EU developmental policy, which in any case calls for good governance and sustainable security. Thus, if the Peace Facility (administered by DG Relex and the Council) and EU aid policy (administered by DG Dev and ECHO) can coherently respond to the nature of Africa’s challenges, which encompasses both conflict and development variables, human security may be enhanced on the African continent.» (Keane 2004).

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Today’s conference has been determined by an overwhelming consensus. This consensus persists in the interdependence of development policy and security policy. The two areas cannot be seen as separate from each other, since development is based on a stable and secure environment and security relates to progress in human development. Finally, effective conflict prevention seems to be unachievable without the reduction of poverty and the achievement of social justice. Thus a development policy concentrating on the long-term stabilisation of living conditions in developing countries promises to be the best way forward to prevent conflict.

Both policy areas constitute two sides of the same token requiring coherent action at EU level. The different policy actors in the fields of foreign, security and development policy will need to integrate their distinct perspectives and approaches into a common concept. This concept has to provide a complementary division of labour and shared responsibilities that lead to a more effective attempt to fight global poverty. In this respect, it has been recognised that the European Draft Constitution defines development policy as an independent policy area within the European Union. Facing the demands for a deepened European policy integration in many areas, it remains imperative to build the human capacities within the EU institutions in order to close the gap currently existing between human resources and tasks at hand.

A basic difference between development policy and foreign and security policy objectives stems from their respective time horizons. Whereas development policy responds to long term objectives, foreign and security policy most often focuses on the short to medium term solution of conflicts. Thus the independent and unique role of development policy needs to be protected within the future institutional setup of the European Union. It is a positive signal that in the future Commission there will still be a Commissioner responsible for development. However, his limited competencies have to be seen critically, since he is only in charge of development cooperation vis-à-vis the ACP countries and not all developing countries.

Representatives of developmental organisations are invited to feed their own perspectives into the policy-making process in a proactive and offensive manner. In particular, the pros and cons of closer cooperation between development and security policy need to be thoroughly reflected. But there must remain a clear dividing line between their respective means and objectives. In this context, the future appropriation of EU funds plays a decisive role. The distribution of financial resources within the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 deserves an intensive and critical review by civil society. In particular, resources available under the European Development Fund need to be safeguarded for development purposes. The financing of peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures under the African Peace Facility, whose objectives are seen as being positive overall, needs to be based on solid but independent sources.

The interrelation between development and security policy opens a debate that constitutes a challenge for civil society’s actors. On the one hand, civil society has to answer to the meaning of human security. For a mother being concerned with nurturing her children, this question refers to the sourcing of food. On the other hand, civil society needs to respond to the challenge of preventing conflict and violence. Human security comprises different aspects and does not merely relate to military action. The traditional conception of security and peace, perceived as the absence of war and armed conflicts, has to be extended to incorporate broader human security needs. This approach requires the integration of all aspects relating to human security, including food security, access to health and education, etc. To conclude, I invite all of us to continue this important debate—and to understand it as a chance to strengthen human security in all its dimensions.

Conclusion
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Annex: A secure Europe in a better world — the European Security Strategy

Javier Solana

Introduction

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to cooperating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.

Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

The security environment: global challenges and key threats

Global challenges

The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict.

In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world’s population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many
cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.

Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.

Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

Key threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.

Regional conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

State failure: Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

Organised crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order it-
In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy.

Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

Strategic objectives

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

Addressing the threats

The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats.

- It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences.

- It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.

- The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe.

Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.
Building security in our neighbourhood

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution – which Europe has long supported – is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the frame-work of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.

An international order based on effective multilateralism

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world.

It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be
increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals. Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.

Policy implications for Europe

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.

We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.

More capable. A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the right direction.

To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.

Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities.

In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations.

Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.

Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence.
among Member States and with partners.

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.

More coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.

Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

Working with partners. There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.

We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.

Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.

Conclusion

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) was founded in 1925 as a political legacy of Germany’s first democratically elected president, Friedrich Ebert. As a cultural non-profit institution, it is committed to the ideas and basic values of social democracy. In its extensive activities, the foundation serves the following aims:

- furthering political and social education of individuals from all walks of life in the spirit of democracy and pluralism,
- facilitating access to university education and research for gifted young people by providing scholarships,
- contributing to international understanding and cooperation.

The FES maintains its own representatives in 70 countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. The foundation engages in projects in the fields of socio-political development and economic and social promotion. The FES sees its activities in developing countries as a contribution to:

- promoting peace and understanding between peoples and inside the partner countries,
- supporting the democratisation of the State and society and strengthening the civil society,
- improving general political, economic and social conditions,
- reinforcing trade unions,
- developing independent media structures,
- facilitating regional and worldwide cooperation between states and different interest groups. Gaining recognition for human rights.

Further information: www.fes.de

terre des hommes

terre des hommes, founded in 1967, is an aid organisation focusing on children and supporting about 350 projects in 28 countries. These include school and training projects, initiatives for street children, working children, child prostitutes and refugee children. It also runs food security and healthcare programmes.

terre des homes helps people to liberate themselves from oppression and economic hardship. It seeks to empower them to try out their own ideas about a life lived in dignity. We do not send outfield workers, preferring to promote local initiatives. With money, advice and networking facilities.

terre des homes endeavours — through campaigns, lobbying and publicity — to influence German political and business circles in the interest of children suffering hunger, exploitation or the aftermath of war.

terre des homes endeavours — through campaigns, lobbying and publicity — to influence decision makers in the interest of children suffering hunger, exploitation or the aftermath of war. Terre des homes action groups are groups of volunteers in 150 German towns and cities. They work on development-related issues at the local level, organising events, sitting on refugee councils and raising funds for projects. The regional offices of terre des homes guarantee the direct contact to the partner organisations, efficient accompaniment and local co-ordination of projects.

Further information: www.tdh.de
World Economy, Ecology & Development (WEED)

WEED was founded in 1990 to boost the advocacy in the Federal Republic of Germany of alleviating global poverty and resolving international environmental problems. WEED campaigns for a course correction in international economic and development policies that would put more emphasis on social justice and environmental sustainability. Its aim is to create more awareness in this respect and develop and implement concrete political alternatives. WEED systematically analyses global economic, environmental and socio-political issues, linking the vision of a socially equitable and environmentally sustainable society to action and policy reform.

WEED is active in the following areas:

- the international debt crises
- IMF & World Bank policies, projects and programmes
- reform and democratisation of international financial markets
- international trade and investment policy (WTO)
- corporate accountability
- international and European environment and development policy

Further information: www.weed-online.org